Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30220888›Full record

ArticleJournal of the European Economic Association2018

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It.

Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of the European Economic Association, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 64 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
64citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

64 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Pooled it
  3. Does more generous health insurance reimbursement lead to moral hazard? Evidence from large-scale administrative data in China.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026
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  11. The cost-effectiveness of value-based insurance design initiatives in managing cardiometabolic diseases: a systematic review.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026
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4 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Liran EinavStanford University.
Amy FinkelsteinMassachusetts Institute of Technology.

Funding

NBER Center for Aging and Health Research-Post COVID-19 Experiences Among Adults with ADRDP30AG012810 · NIA · NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH · PI DAVID M CUTLER · 1999 to 2026
$24.6M
The Effect of Health Insurance on Utilization and Outcomes: The Oregon LotteryRC2AG036631 · NIA · NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH · PI BAICKER, KATHERINE, FINKELSTEIN, AMY N. · 2009 to 2010
$11.5M
What Does Health Insurance Do? Evidence from the Oregon Health Insurance LotteryR01AG034151 · NIA · NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH · PI BAICKER, KATHERINE, FINKELSTEIN, AMY N. · 2010 to 2022
$9.1M
Determinants of Elderly Health: The Role of Place-Based FactorsR37AG032449 · NIA · MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY · PI FINKELSTEIN, AMY N. · 2020 to 2025
$5.9M
The Design of Social Insurance for the Elderly: Public Pensions & Health InsurancR01AG032449 · NIA · NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH · PI EINAV, LIRAN, FINKELSTEIN, AMY N. · 2009 to 2019
$5.6M
NIA NIH HHS P30 AG012810NIA NIH HHS R01 AG032449NIA NIH HHS R01 AG034151NIA NIH HHS R37 AG032449NIA NIH HHS RC2 AG036631
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

We describe research on the impact of health insurance on healthcare spending ("moral hazard"), and use this context to illustrate the value of and important complementarities between different empirical approaches. One common approach is to emphasize a credible research design; we review results from two randomized experiments, as well as some quasi-experimental studies. This work has produced compelling evidence that moral hazard in health insurance exists-that is, individuals, on average, consume less healthcare when they are required to pay more for it out of pocket-as well as qualitative evidence about its nature. These studies alone, however, provide little guidance for forecasting healthcare spending under contracts not directly observed in the data. Therefore, a second and complementary approach is to develop an economic model that can be used out of sample. We note that modeling choices can be consequential: different economic models may fit the reduced form but deliver different counterfactual predictions. An additional role of the more descriptive analyses is therefore to provide guidance regarding model choice.

Identifiers

PMID30220888
PMCPMC6128379

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.