Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30104372›Full record

ReviewProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2018

How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared intentionality account.

Michael Tomasello

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 60 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
60citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

60 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Learning mechanisms influencing infants' early socio-pragmatic abilities.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2025
    Trial
  3. Article
  4. The Intriguingly Social N400 of Preverbal Infants.Developmental neurobiology · 2026
    Article
  5. Young children understand how social connections affect what people know about each other.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Re-evaluating Theory of Mind evaluation in large language models.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2025
    Article
  9. Pragmatic communication and Theory of Mind.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2025
    Review
  10. Review
  11. Taking theory of mind research into much needed new terrain - a commentary on Kochanska et al. (2025).Journal of child psychology and psychiatry, and allied disciplines · 2025
    Article
  12. Bonobos point more for ignorant than knowledgeable social partners.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  13. Article
  14. Review
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Selective Action Prediction in Infancy Depending on Linguistic Cues: An EEG and Eyetracker Study.The Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience · 2024
    Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Michael TomaselloDepartment of Psychology & Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708; michael.tomasello@duke.edu.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

To predict and explain the behavior of others, one must understand that their actions are determined not by reality but by their beliefs about reality. Classically, children come to understand beliefs, including false beliefs, at about 4-5 y of age, but recent studies using different response measures suggest that even infants (and apes!) have some skills as well. Resolving this discrepancy is not possible with current theories based on individual cognition. Instead, what is needed is an account recognizing that the key processes in constructing an understanding of belief are social and mental coordination with other persons and their (sometimes conflicting) perspectives. Engaging in such social and mental coordination involves species-unique skills and motivations of shared intentionality, especially as they are manifest in joint attention and linguistic communication, as well as sophisticated skills of executive function to coordinate the different perspectives involved. This shared intentionality account accords well with documented differences in the cognitive capacities of great apes and human children, and it explains why infants and apes pass some versions of false-belief tasks whereas only older children pass others.

Indexed as

CultureSocial BehaviorChildChild, PreschoolComprehensionFemaleHumansImaginationMaledevelopmentfalse beliefshared intentionalitysocial cognitiontheory of mind

Identifiers

PMID30104372
PMCPMC6112688

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.