Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30099218›Full record

ArticleJournal of health economics2018

Deriving risk adjustment payment weights to maximize efficiency of health insurance markets.

Timothy J Layton, Thomas G McGuire, Richard C van Kleef

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of health economics, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 20 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
20citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

20 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Ex ante evaluation of risk adjustment models for prospective provider payment: a conceptual framework and empirical application.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026
    Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. A critical review of the use of RThe European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2025
    Review
  5. Setting incentives right with long-term risk adjustment.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2025
    Article
  6. Review
  7. Review
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Use of past care markers in risk-adjustment: accounting for systematic differences across providers.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2022
    Article
  13. Incorporating self-reported health measures in risk equalization through constrained regression.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2020
    Article
  14. Article
  15. Article
  16. The Comparative Advantage of Medicare Advantage.American journal of health economics · 2019
    Article
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies.The journal of economic perspectives : a journal of the American Economic Association
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Timothy J LaytonDepartment of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School and NBER, United States. Electronic address: layton@hcp.med.harvard.edu.
Thomas G McGuireDepartment of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School and NBER, United States.
Richard C van KleefErasmus School of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands.

Funding

Tradeoffs in the Design of Public Long-Term Care BenefitsP01AG032952 · NIA · HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL · PI Bruce E. Landon · 2009 to 2026
$39.0M
Health Policy Training Program: Promoting Outcomes, Quality, Equity and Diffusion of AdvancesT32MH019733 · NIMH · HARVARD UNIVERSITY (MEDICAL SCHOOL) · PI Benjamin Le Cook, Haiden A Huskamp · 1993 to 2026
$7.0M
Mental Health Coverage in Health Care ReformR01MH094290 · NIMH · HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL · PI MCGUIRE, THOMAS G. · 2011 to 2015
$2.1M
NIA NIH HHS P01 AG032952NIMH NIH HHS R01 MH094290NIMH NIH HHS T32 MH019733
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Risk-adjustment is critical to the functioning of regulated health insurance markets. To date, estimation and evaluation of a risk-adjustment model has been based on statistical rather than economic objective functions. We develop a framework where the objective of risk-adjustment is to minimize the efficiency loss from service-level distortions due to adverse selection, and we use the framework to develop a welfare-grounded method for estimating risk-adjustment weights. We show that when the number of risk adjustor variables exceeds the number of decisions plans make about service allocations, incentives for service-level distortion can always be eliminated via a constrained least-squares regression. When the number of plan service-level allocation decisions exceeds the number of risk-adjusters, the optimal weights can be found by an OLS regression on a straightforward transformation of the data. We illustrate this method with the data used to estimate risk-adjustment payment weights in the Netherlands (N = 16.5 million).

Indexed as

Efficiency, OrganizationalHumansInsurance, HealthModels, EconomicRisk AdjustmentAdverse selectionHealth insuranceRisk adjustment

Identifiers

PMID30099218
PMCPMC6471663

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.