ReviewJAMA oncology2019
Optimizing Cancer Treatment Using Game Theory: A Review.
Review in JAMA oncology, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 82 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
82 citing papers in PubMed, 213 citations in OpenAlex.
- Affordable Prices Without Threatening the Oncological R&D Pipeline-An Economic Experiment on Transparency in Price Negotiations.Cancer research communications · 2022Trial
- A novel combination therapy for ER+ breast cancer suppresses drug resistance via an evolutionary double-bind.Molecular systems biology · 2026Article
- The embryo game uncovers hidden cell behaviours.Nature communications · 2026Article
- Review
- Optimal control theory as a method for designing multidrug adaptive therapy regimens.NPJ systems biology and applications · 2026Article
- Can evolutionary therapy be applied in non-small cell lung cancer?Scientific reports · 2026Article
- 75 Years of Mathematical Oncology.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2026Article
- Dynamic analysis of weak prisoner's dilemma game considering conservative and aggressive cooperative strategy.PloS one · 2026Article
- Article
- Cancer, collapse, and the politics of somatic evolution.Evolution, medicine, and public health · 2026Review
- A Darwinian model for the evolution of drug resistance to long-acting PrEP during an early HIV infection.PloS one · 2026Article
- Systems biology successes and areas for opportunity in prostate cancer.Endocrine-related cancer · 2025Review
- Bringing evolutionary cancer therapy to the clinic: a systems approach.NPJ systems biology and applications · 2025Review
- Optimizing the Future: A Game Theory to Tumor Therapeutic Strategies.Biological procedures online · 2025Article
- Validation of polymorphic Gompertzian model of cancer through in vitro and in vivo data.PloS one · 2025Article
- Stackelberg Evolutionary Games of Cancer Treatment: What Treatment Strategy to Choose if Cancer Can be Stabilized?Dynamic games and applications · 2025Article
- Adaptive Treatment of Metastatic Prostate Cancer Using Generative Artificial Intelligence.Clinical Medicine Insights. Oncology · 2025Review
- Phenotypic Plasticity, Non-genetic Mechanisms, and Immune Drug Resistance in Cancer.Cancer treatment and research · 2025Review
- Stability of the Darwinian Dynamics: Effect of Intraspecific Competition and Human Intervention.Dynamic games and applications · 2025Article
- Research Progress with Atractylone as an Antitumor Agent.Molecules (Basel, Switzerland) · 2024Review
22 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
4 authors at 2 institutions in 2 countries.
Funding
Abstract
Importance: While systemic therapy for disseminated cancer is often initially successful, malignant cells, using diverse adaptive strategies encoded in the human genome, almost invariably evolve resistance, leading to treatment failure. Thus, the Darwinian dynamics of resistance are formidable barriers to all forms of systemic cancer treatment but rarely integrated into clinical trial design or included within precision oncology initiatives. Observations: We investigate cancer treatment as a game theoretic contest between the physician's therapy and the cancer cells' resistance strategies. This game has 2 critical asymmetries: (1) Only the physician can play rationally. Cancer cells, like all evolving organisms, can only adapt to current conditions; they can neither anticipate nor evolve adaptations for treatments that the physician has not yet applied. (2) It has a distinctive leader-follower (or "Stackelberg") dynamics; the "leader" oncologist plays first and the "follower" cancer cells then respond and adapt to therapy. Current treatment protocols for metastatic cancer typically exploit neither asymmetry. By repeatedly administering the same drug(s) until disease progression, the physician "plays" a fixed strategy even as the opposing cancer cells continuously evolve successful adaptive responses. Furthermore, by changing treatment only when the tumor progresses, the physician cedes leadership to the cancer cells and treatment failure becomes nearly inevitable. Without fundamental changes in strategy, standard-of-care cancer therapy typically results in "Nash solutions" in which no unilateral change in treatment can favorably alter the outcome. Conclusions and Relevance: Physicians can exploit the advantages inherent in the asymmetries of the cancer treatment game, and likely improve outcomes, by adopting more dynamic treatment protocols that integrate eco-evolutionary dynamics and modulate therapy accordingly. Implementing this approach will require new metrics of tumor response that incorporate both ecological (ie, size) and evolutionary (ie, molecular mechanisms of resistance and relative size of resistant population) changes.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.