ArticleFrontiers in psychology2018
Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity.
Article in Frontiers in psychology, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers.
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Who cites it
10 citing papers in PubMed.
- Qualities, subjectivity and spatial extension: is there a common factor?Frontiers in psychology · 2026Article
- The Constrained Disorder Principle May Account for Consciousness.Brain sciences · 2024Review
- The hidden structure of consciousness.Frontiers in psychology · 2024Article
- Approaching the nature of consciousness through a phenomenal analysis of early vision. What is the explanandum?Frontiers in psychology · 2024Article
- How-tests for consciousness and direct neurophenomenal structuralism.Frontiers in psychology · 2024Review
- A First Principles Approach to Subjective Experience.Frontiers in systems neuroscience · 2022Article
- Neurocentrist identity theory and neuro-phenomenal typing: A commentary on Manzotti's, "The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit".Frontiers in psychology · 2022Article
- Free Will as a Paradox: Empirical Evaluation of the Construct of Everyday Consciousness.Psychology in Russia : state of the art · 2021Article
- Evolving Consciousness: Insights From Turing, and the Shaping of Experience.Frontiers in behavioral neuroscience · 2020Article
- How to Mitigate the Hard Problem by Adopting the Dual Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Frontiers in psychology · 2019Review
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
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Abstract
One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (see Against Causal Accounts of NCCs) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of
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