Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30042391›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2018

Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity.

Simone Righi, Károly Takács

Erratum issuedAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. An erratum has been issued. Cited by 9 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
9citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

9 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Article
  4. Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Article
  5. Reputation and socio-ecology in humans.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Review
  6. Networks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Review
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Simone RighiDepartment of Computer Science, University College London, London, WC1E 6EA, United Kingdom. s.righi@ucl.ac.uk.
Károly TakácsHungarian Academy of Sciences, MTA TK "Lendület" Research Center for Educational and Network Studies (RECENS), Budapest, 1097, Hungary.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9126-3233

Funding

EC | European Research Council (ERC) 648693
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Direct and indirect reciprocity are good candidates to explain the fundamental problem of evolution of cooperation. We explore the conditions under which different types of reciprocity gain dominance and their performances in sustaining cooperation in the PD played on simple networks. We confirm that direct reciprocity gains dominance over indirect reciprocity strategies also in larger populations, as long as it has no memory constraints. In the absence of direct reciprocity, or when its memory is flawed, different forms of indirect reciprocity strategies are able to dominate and to support cooperation. We show that indirect reciprocity relying on social capital inherent in closed triads is the best competitor among them, outperforming indirect reciprocity that uses information from any source. Results hold in a wide range of conditions with different evolutionary update rules, extent of evolutionary pressure, initial conditions, population size, and density.

Identifiers

PMID30042391
PMCPMC6057955

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.