ArticlePLoS computational biology2018
Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game.
Article in PLoS computational biology, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 22 papers.
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Who cites it
22 citing papers in PubMed.
- Impact of resource availability and conformity effect on sustainability of common-pool resources.Fundamental research · 2025Article
- A new electoral bottom-up model of institutional governance.Scientific reports · 2025Article
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- The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Article
- An evolutionary game for the behavior of third-party evaluators in pension public-private partnership incorporating public participation.Scientific reports · 2023Article
- Managing ecological thresholds of a risky commons.Royal Society open science · 2023Article
- Behavioral vaccination policies and game-environment feedback in epidemic dynamics.Scientific reports · 2023Article
- Nonlinear eco-evolutionary games with global environmental fluctuations and local environmental feedbacks.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- Article
- Generic catastrophic poverty when selfish investors exploit a degradable common resource.Royal Society open science · 2023Article
- Evolution as a result of resource flow in ecosystems: Ecological dynamics can drive evolution.PloS one · 2023Article
- The probabilistic pool punishment proportional to the difference of payoff outperforms previous pool and peer punishment.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Dynamics of collective action to conserve a large common-pool resource.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- Learning enables adaptation in cooperation for multi-player stochastic games.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2020Article
- Article
- Steering eco-evolutionary game dynamics with manifold control.Proceedings. Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2020Article
- Cross-scale cooperation enables sustainable use of a common-pool resource.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2019Article
- Large-scale cooperation driven by reputation, not fear of divine punishment.Royal Society open science · 2019Article
- Coevolution between the cost of decision and the strategy contributes to the evolution of cooperation.Scientific reports · 2019Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group seems to be an adequate reaction. This conclusion, however, is less straightforward when we acknowledge the fact that resources are finite and even a renewable resource has limited growing capacity. To clarify the possible consequences, we consider a coevolutionary model where beside the payoff-driven competition of cooperator and defector players the level of a renewable resource depends sensitively on the fraction of cooperators and the total consumption of all players. The applied feedback-evolving game reveals that beside a delicately adjusted punishment it is also fundamental that cooperators should pay special attention to the growing capacity of renewable resources. Otherwise, even the usage of tough punishment cannot save the community from an undesired end.
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