Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29992674›Full record

ArticleHealth economics2018

The effects of state-level pharmacist regulations on generic substitution of prescription drugs.

Yan Song, Douglas Barthold

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health economics, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Tough versus soft regulations to promote generic medications in Italy.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026
    Article
  2. Article
  3. Utilization of Generic Cardiovascular Drugs in Medicare's Part D Program.Circulation. Cardiovascular quality and outcomes · 2021
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Yan SongInstitute for Economic and Social Research, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China.ORCID 0000-0002-8669-4116
Douglas BartholdThe Comparative Health Outcome, Policy, and Economics (CHOICE) Institute, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, USA.ORCID 0000-0003-0511-5520

Funding

USC Resource Center for Minority Aging Research (US-RCMAR)P30AG043073 · NIA · UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA · PI EMMA AGUILA, JENNIFER A AILSHIRE · 2012 to 2026
$10.1M
AN ECONOMIC AND BEHAVIORAL EVALUATION OF MEDICARE PART DP01AG033559 · NIA · UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA · PI GOLDMAN, DANA P · 2011 to 2015
$3.0M
Value of Information Methods for NHLBI TrialsR01HL126804 · NHLBI · UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON · PI BASU, ANIRBAN · 2015 to 2018
$2.7M
CIHR Interdisciplinary Capacity Enhanced Team HOA-80072lCIHR Operating MOP 93546Healthier Societies Initiative at the Institute for Health and Social Policy (IHSP)Heller Family FellowshipM&P Vineberg Fellowship in EconomicsMcCall MacBain FellowshipMcGill UniversityMcGill University Principal's Graduate FellowshipMcGill University Provost's Graduate FellowshipNHLBI NIH HHS R01 HL126804NIA NIH HHS P01 AG033559NIA NIH HHS P01AG033559NIA NIH HHS P30 AG043073NIH HHS R01HL126804NIH HHS R01HL130642Russell Davidson SSHRC AwardWYNG Trust Fellowship
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Substituting generic for brand name drugs whenever possible has been proposed to control prescription drug expenditure growth in the United States. This work investigates two types of state laws that regulate the procedures under which pharmacists substitute bioequivalent generic versions of brand name drugs. Mandatory substitution laws require pharmacists to use the generic as a default, and presumed consent laws allow them to assume that the patient agrees to the substitution. Both situations can be overruled by the patient. Using plausibly exogenous changes in states' laws, we use difference-in-differences and a discrete choice model to show that although the mandatory switching laws have little effect, the presumed consent laws reduce consumers' probability of purchasing brand name drugs by 3.2% points. The differential effectiveness of the laws is likely caused by pharmacists' profit motives. These results offer important implications for policies that seek to reduce drug expenditures by incentivizing the use of generic drugs.

Indexed as

Government RegulationDrug PrescriptionsDrugs, GenericDrug SubstitutionFemaleHumansMaleMiddle AgedPharmacistsUnited StatesDrugs, Genericgeneric drugsgeneric substitutionpharmacist regulationprescription drugspresumed consent

Identifiers

PMID29992674
PMCPMC6172151

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.