Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29961214›Full record

ArticleHealth care analysis : HCA : journal of health philosophy and policy2019

Between the Reasonable and the Particular: Deflating Autonomy in the Legal Regulation of Informed Consent to Medical Treatment.

Michael Dunn, K W M Fulford, Jonathan Herring, Ashok Handa

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In one paragraph

Article in Health care analysis : HCA : journal of health philosophy and policy, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 14 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
14citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

14 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
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  4. Article
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
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  9. Article
  10. Review
  11. Ensuring Risk Awareness of Vulnerable Patients in the Post-Montgomery Era: Treading a Fine Line.Health care analysis : HCA : journal of health philosophy and policy · 2020
    Article
  12. Article
  13. Review
  14. Involving Independent Mental Capacity Advocates (IMCAs) in Dental Care Decision-Making: A Qualitative Exploration of Dentists' Experiences in England and Wales.Special care in dentistry : official publication of the American Association of Hospital Dentists, the Academy of Dentistry for the Handicapped, and the American Society for Geriatric Dentistry
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Michael DunnThe Ethox Centre, Nuffield Department of Population Health, University of Oxford, Big Data Institute Building, Old Road Campus, Headington, Oxford, OX3 7LF, UK. michael.dunn@ethox.ox.ac.uk.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5603-6200
K W M FulfordCollaborating Centre for Values-based Practice in Health and Social Care, St Catherine's College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3UJ, UK.
Jonathan HerringFaculty of Law and Exeter College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX3 1DP, UK.
Ashok HandaNuffield Department of Surgical Sciences, University of Oxford, John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, OX3 9DU, UK.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The law of informed consent to medical treatment has recently been extensively overhauled in England. The 2015 Montgomery judgment has done away with the long-held position that the information to be disclosed by doctors when obtaining valid consent from patients should be determined on the basis of what a reasonable body of medical opinion agree ought to be disclosed in the circumstances. The UK Supreme Court concluded that the information that is material to a patient's decision should instead be judged by reference to a new two-limbed test founded on the notions of the 'reasonable person' and the 'particular patient'. The rationale outlined in Montgomery for this new test of materiality, and academic comment on the ruling's significance, has focused on the central ethical importance that the law now (rightfully) accords to respect for patient autonomy in the process of obtaining consent from patients. In this paper, we dispute the claim that the new test of materiality articulated in Montgomery equates with respect for autonomy being given primacy in re-shaping the development of the law in this area. We also defend this position, arguing that our revised interpretation of Montgomery's significance does not equate with a failure by the courts to give due legal consideration to what is owed to patients as autonomous decision-makers in the consent process. Instead, Montgomery correctly implies that doctors are ethically (and legally) obliged to attend to a number of relevant ethical considerations in framing decisions about consent to treatment, which include subtle interpretations of the values of autonomy and well-being. Doctors should give appropriate consideration to how these values are fleshed out and balanced in context in order to specify precisely what information ought to be disclosed to a patient as a requirement of obtaining consent, and as a core component of shared decision-making within medical encounters more generally.

Indexed as

Decision MakingDisclosurePersonal AutonomyEnglandHumansInformed ConsentPhysiciansInformed consentMedical lawPatient autonomyReasonable personShared decision making

Identifiers

What OpenQuestion holds

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Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.