Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29920549›Full record

ArticlePloS one2018

Time delays in the response to the Neisseria meningitidis serogroup C outbreak in Nigeria - 2017.

Assad Hassan, G U Mustapha, Bola B Lawal, Aliyu M Na'uzo, Raji Ismail, Eteng Womi-Eteng Oboma, Oyeronke Oyebanji, Jeremiah Agenyi, Chima Thomas, Muhammad Shakir Balogun and 3 more

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 6 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
6citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

6 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

13 authors.

Assad HassanNigeria Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Programme, Abuja, Nigeria.ORCID 0000-0002-8860-5578
G U MustaphaNigeria Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Programme, Abuja, Nigeria.
Bola B LawalNigeria Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Programme, Abuja, Nigeria.
Aliyu M Na'uzoNigeria Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Programme, Abuja, Nigeria.ORCID 0000-0002-0048-2228
Raji IsmailNigeria Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Programme, Abuja, Nigeria.
Eteng Womi-Eteng ObomaNigeria Centre for Disease Control, Abuja, Nigeria.
Oyeronke OyebanjiNigeria Centre for Disease Control, Abuja, Nigeria.
Jeremiah AgenyiNigeria Centre for Disease Control, Abuja, Nigeria.
Chima ThomasWorld Health Organisation, Borno, Nigeria.
Muhammad Shakir BalogunNigeria Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Programme, Abuja, Nigeria.
Mahmood M DalhatNigeria Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Programme, Abuja, Nigeria.
Patrick NgukuNigeria Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Programme, Abuja, Nigeria.
Chikwe IhekweazuNigeria Centre for Disease Control, Abuja, Nigeria.

Funding

World Health Organization 001
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundNigeria reports high rates of mortality linked with recurring meningococcal meningitis outbreaks within the African meningitis belt. Few studies have thoroughly described the response to these outbreaks to provide strong and actionable public health messages. We describe how time delays affected the response to the 2016/2017 meningococcal meningitis outbreak in Nigeria.

methodsUsing data from Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA), World Health Organisation (WHO), and situation reports of rapid response teams, we calculated attack and death rates of reported suspected meningococcal meningitis cases per week in Zamfara, Sokoto and Yobe states respectively, between epidemiological week 49 in 2016 and epidemiological week 25 in 2017. We identified when alert and epidemic thresholds were crossed and determined when the outbreak was detected and notified in each state. We examined response activities to the outbreak.

resultsThere were 12,535 suspected meningococcal meningitis cases and 877 deaths (CFR: 7.0%) in the three states. It took an average time of three weeks before the outbreaks were detected and notified to NCDC. Four weeks after receiving notification, an integrated response coordinating centre was set up by NCDC and requests for vaccines were sent to International Coordinating Group (ICG) on vaccine provision. While it took ICG one week to approve the requests, it took an average of two weeks for approximately 41% of requested vaccines to arrive. On the average, it took nine weeks from the date the epidemic threshold was crossed to commencement of reactive vaccination in the three states.

conclusionThere were delays in detection and notification of the outbreak, in coordinating response activities, in requesting for vaccines and their arrival from ICG, and in initiating reactive vaccination. Reducing these delays in future outbreaks could help decrease the morbidity and mortality linked with meningococcal meningitis outbreaks.

Indexed as

Disease OutbreaksAdolescentAdultChildChild, PreschoolFemaleHumansInfantMaleMeningitis, MeningococcalMortalityNeisseria meningitidisNigeriaSerogroupVaccinesYoung AdultVaccines

Identifiers

PMID29920549
PMCPMC6007901

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.