Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29876719›Full record

ArticleJournal of bioethical inquiry2018

Responsibility as an Obstacle to Good Policy: The Case of Lifestyle Related Disease.

Neil Levy

Open access · hybridAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of bioethical inquiry, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
0.5field-weighted citation impact, top 37% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed, 9 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author at 1 institution in 2 countries.

Neil LevyDepartment of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, 3800, Australia. neil.levy@philosophy.ox.ac.uk.ORCID 0000-0002-5679-1986
University of Oxford · GB

Funding

Wellcome Trust 104848Wellcome Trust 104848/Z/14/ZWellcome Trust WT104848/Z/14/Z
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

There is a lively debate over who is to blame for the harms arising from unhealthy behaviours, like overeating and excessive drinking. In this paper, I argue that given how demanding the conditions required for moral responsibility actually are, we cannot be highly confident that anyone is ever morally responsible. I also adduce evidence that holding people responsible for their unhealthy behaviours has costs: it undermines public support for the measures that are likely to have the most impact on these harms. I claim that these two facts-the fact that we cannot be highly confident that anyone is morally responsible and the fact that holding people responsible for their unhealthy behaviours has costs-interact. Together they give us a powerful reason for believing, or acting as if we believed, that ordinary people are not in fact responsible for their unhealthy behaviours.

Indexed as

Health BehaviorHealth PolicyLife StyleMoral ObligationsSocial BehaviorSocial ResponsibilityDissent and DisputesHumansPublic OpinionLifestyle diseaseObesityPolicyResponsibility

Identifiers

PMID29876719
PMCPMC6209033
OpenAlexW2806261855

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.