Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29857959›Full record

ArticleForensic science international2018

A response to "Likelihood ratio as weight of evidence: A closer look" by Lund and Iyer.

Simone Gittelson, Charles E H Berger, Graham Jackson, Ian W Evett, Christophe Champod, Bernard Robertson, James M Curran, Duncan Taylor, Bruce S Weir, Michael D Coble and 1 more

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Forensic science international, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
8citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

8 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. A Bayesian network approach to evaluating footwear evidence.Forensic science international. Synergy · 2026
    Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Interpol review of glass and paint evidence 2016-2019.Forensic science international. Synergy · 2020
    Review
  7. Article
  8. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

11 authors.

Simone GittelsonCentre for Forensic Science, University of Technology Sydney, P.O. Box 123, Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia. Electronic address: simone.gittelson@uts.edu.au.
Charles E H BergerLeiden University, Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, P.O. Box 9520, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands.
Graham JacksonAdvance Forensic Science, St. Andrews, Scotland, UK; School of Science, Engineering and Technology, Abertay University, Dundee, Scotland, UK.
Ian W EvettPrincipal Forensic Services Ltd., 34 Southborough Road, Bickley, Bromley, Kent BR1 2EB, UK.
Christophe ChampodEcole des Sciences Criminelles, Faculty of Law, Criminal Justice and Public Administration, Université de Lausanne, Batochime - Quartier Sorge, CH-1015 Lausanne-Dorigny, Switzerland.
Bernard RobertsonWellington, New Zealand.
James M CurranDepartment of Statistics, University of Auckland, PB 92019, Auckland, New Zealand.
Duncan TaylorForensic Science South Australia, 21 Divett Place, Adelaide, SA 5000, Australia; School of Biological Sciences, Flinders University, GPO Box 2100, Adelaide, SA 5001, Australia.
Bruce S WeirUniversity of Washington, Department of Biostatistics, Seattle, WA 98195, United States.
Michael D CobleNational Institute of Standards and Technology, Applied Genetics Group, 100 Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, United States; Center for Human Identification, University of North Texas Health Science Center, 3500 Camp Bowie Blvd, Fort Worth, TX 76107, United States.
John S BuckletonUniversity of Washington, Department of Biostatistics, Seattle, WA 98195, United States; Institute of Environmental Science and Research Limited, Private Bag 92021, Auckland 1142, New Zealand.

Funding

Theoretical Population Genetics SupplementR01GM075091 · NIGMS · UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON · PI WEIR, BRUCE S. · 2006 to 2020
$4.7M
BLRD VA I01 BX000136NIGMS NIH HHS R01 GM075091
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Recently, Lund and Iyer (L&I) raised an argument regarding the use of likelihood ratios in court. In our view, their argument is based on a lack of understanding of the paradigm. L&I argue that the decision maker should not accept the expert's likelihood ratio without further consideration. This is agreed by all parties. In normal practice, there is often considerable and proper exploration in court of the basis for any probabilistic statement. We conclude that L&I argue against a practice that does not exist and which no one advocates. Further we conclude that the most informative summary of evidential weight is the likelihood ratio. We state that this is the summary that should be presented to a court in every scientific assessment of evidential weight with supporting information about how it was constructed and on what it was based.

Indexed as

Bayesian approachBayes’ theoremEvidential weightForensic evidence interpretationLR

Identifiers

PMID29857959
PMCPMC7306225

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.