Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29793929›Full record

Trial reportThe British journal of ophthalmology2018

Financial disincentives? A three-armed randomised controlled trial of the effect of financial Incentives in Diabetic Eye Assessment by Screening (IDEAS) trial.

Gaby Judah, Ara Darzi, Ivo Vlaev, Laura Gunn, Derek King, Dominic King, Jonathan Valabhji, Colin Bicknell

Open access · bronzeAbstract readRandomized Controlled Trial
In one paragraph

Trial report in The British journal of ophthalmology, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers, 3 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
10citing papers in PubMed, 3 pooled it
5.0field-weighted citation impact, top 5% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

10 citing papers in PubMed, 3 syntheses or guidelines pooled it, 19 citations in OpenAlex.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

8 authors at 3 institutions in 2 countries.

Gaby JudahDepartment of Surgery and Cancer, Imperial College London, London, UK.ORCID 0000-0003-3322-9760
Ara DarziDepartment of Surgery and Cancer, Imperial College London, London, UK.
Ivo VlaevWarwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK.
Laura GunnPublic Health Program, Stetson University, DeLand, Florida, USA.
Derek KingPersonal Social Services Research Unit (PSSRU), London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Dominic KingDepartment of Surgery and Cancer, Imperial College London, London, UK.
Jonathan ValabhjiDepartment of Medicine, Imperial College London, London, UK.
Colin BicknellDepartment of Surgery and Cancer, Imperial College London, London, UK colin.bicknell@imperial.ac.uk.
Imperial College London · GBStetson University · USUniversity of Warwick · GB

Funding

Department of Health 12/64/112
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveConflicting evidence exists regarding the impact of financial incentives on encouraging attendance at medical screening appointments. The primary aim was to determine whether financial incentives increase attendance at diabetic eye screening in persistent non-attenders. METHODS AND ANALYSIS: A three-armed randomised controlled trial was conducted in London in 2015. 1051 participants aged over 16 years, who had not attended eye screening appointments for 2 years or more, were randomised (1.4:1:1 randomisation ratio) to receive the usual invitation letter (control), an offer of £10 cash for attending screening (fixed incentive) or a 1 in 100 chance of winning £1000 (lottery incentive) if they attend. The primary outcome was the proportion of invitees attending screening, and a comparative analysis was performed to assess group differences. Pairwise comparisons of attendance rates were performed, using a conservative Bonferroni correction for independent comparisons.

results34/435 (7.8%) of control, 17/312 (5.5%) of fixed incentive and 10/304 (3.3%) of lottery incentive groups attended. Participants who received any incentive were significantly less likely to attend their appointment compared with controls (risk ratio (RR)=0.56; 95% CI 0.34 to 0.92). Those in the probabilistic incentive group (RR=0.42; 95% CI 0.18 to 0.98), but not the fixed incentive group (RR=1.66; 95% CI 0.65 to 4.21), were significantly less likely to attend than those in the control group.

conclusionFinancial incentives, particularly lottery-based incentives, attract fewer patients to diabetic eye screening than standard invites in this population. Financial incentives should not be used to promote screening unless tested in context, as they may negatively affect attendance rates.

Indexed as

MotivationReimbursement, IncentiveRewardAdolescentAdultAgedAged, 80 and overDiabetic RetinopathyDouble-Blind MethodEconomics, BehavioralFemaleHealth BehaviorHumansMaleMiddle AgedPatient CompliancePublic healthRetina

Identifiers

PMID29793929
PMCPMC6059038
OpenAlexW2803635223

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.