ArticleFrontiers in psychology2018
'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference.
Article in Frontiers in psychology, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 50 papers.
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Who cites it
50 citing papers in PubMed.
- Understanding mechanisms of voluntary engagement of mental effort using active inference.Cognitive, affective & behavioral neuroscience · 2026Article
- From self-organizing systems to subjective temporal extension.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2026Article
- The phantastic organ: predictive processing in the brain.Frontiers in psychology · 2026Review
- Learning to attenuate myself: a predictive processing account of body-scan meditation and the dissolution of bodily boundaries.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2026Article
- Born to act: Deferred action and desire as active inference.Cognitive, affective & behavioral neuroscience · 2025Review
- It Is Movement All the Way Down: Broken Rhythms and Embodied Selfhood in Depersonalization.Behavioral sciences (Basel, Switzerland) · 2025Article
- Flow and intuition: a systems neuroscience comparison.Neuroscience of consciousness · 2025Article
- Minding the moving self: the centrality of body movement in the neurodynamics of the self and psychotherapeutic implications.Frontiers in psychiatry · 2025Review
- Qualia as query act, the phenomenology of predictive error coding.Frontiers in psychology · 2025Article
- Active inference goes to school: the importance of active learning in the age of large language models.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2024Article
- The Many Roles of Precision in Action.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2024Review
- When the interoceptive and conceptual clash: The case of oppositional phenomenal self-modelling in Tourette syndrome.Cognitive, affective & behavioral neuroscience · 2024Review
- Self-Disorder in Schizophrenia: A Revised View (1. Comprehensive Review-Dualities of Self- and World-Experience).Schizophrenia bulletin · 2024Review
- Order and change in art: towards an active inference account of aesthetic experience.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2024Review
- A model of time-varying music engagement.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2024Review
- Surfing uncertainty with screams: predictive processing, error dynamics and horror films.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Bistable perception, precision and neuromodulation.Cerebral cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991) · 2024Article
- Forgetting ourselves in flow: an active inference account of flow states and how we experience ourselves within them.Frontiers in psychology · 2024Article
- The police hunch: the Bayesian brain, active inference, and the free energy principle in action.Frontiers in psychology · 2024Article
- Cognitive effort and active inference.Neuropsychologia · 2023Article
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Abstract
One of the central claims of the Self-model Theory of Subjectivity is that the experience of being someone - even in a minimal form - arises through a transparent phenomenal self-model, which itself can in principle be reduced to brain processes. Here, we consider whether it is possible to distinguish between phenomenally transparent and opaque states in terms of active inference. We propose a relationship of phenomenal opacity to expected uncertainty or precision; i.e., the capacity for introspective attention and implicit mental action. Thus we associate introspective attention with the deployment of 'precision' that may render the perceptual evidence (for action) opaque, while treating transparency as a necessary aspect of beliefs about action, i.e., 'what I am' doing. We conclude by proposing how we may have to nuance our conception of minimal phenomenal selfhood and agency in light of this active inference conception of transparency-opacity.
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