Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29768714›Full record

ArticleInfluenza and other respiratory viruses2018

Detection of an avian lineage influenza A(H7N2) virus in air and surface samples at a New York City feline quarantine facility.

Francoise M Blachere, William G Lindsley, Angela M Weber, Donald H Beezhold, Robert E Thewlis, Kenneth R Mead, John D Noti

Open access · goldAbstract read
PubMed Full text at PMC Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in Influenza and other respiratory viruses, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
1.3field-weighted citation impact, top 20% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 23 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
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  5. Review
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  7. Review
  8. Canine and Feline Influenza.Cold Spring Harbor perspectives in medicine · 2021
    Review
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

7 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Francoise M BlachereAllergy and Clinical Immunology Branch, Health Effects Laboratory Division, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Morgantown, WV, USA.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1022-9741
William G LindsleyAllergy and Clinical Immunology Branch, Health Effects Laboratory Division, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Morgantown, WV, USA.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0720-5829
Angela M WeberDisaster Science Responder Research Program, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA.
Donald H BeezholdAllergy and Clinical Immunology Branch, Health Effects Laboratory Division, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Morgantown, WV, USA.
Robert E ThewlisAllergy and Clinical Immunology Branch, Health Effects Laboratory Division, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Morgantown, WV, USA.
Kenneth R MeadEngineering and Physical Hazards Branch, Division of Applied Research and Technology, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Cincinnati, OH, USA.
John D NotiAllergy and Clinical Immunology Branch, Health Effects Laboratory Division, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Morgantown, WV, USA.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention · US

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundIn December 2016, an outbreak of low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) A(H7N2) occurred in cats at a New York City animal shelter and quickly spread to other shelters in New York and Pennsylvania. The A(H7N2) virus also spread to an attending veterinarian. In response, 500 cats were transferred from these shelters to a temporary quarantine facility for continued monitoring and treatment.

objectivesThe objective of this study was to assess the occupational risk of A(H7N2) exposure among emergency response workers at the feline quarantine facility.

methodsAerosol and surface samples were collected from inside and outside the isolation zones of the quarantine facility. Samples were screened for A(H7N2) by quantitative RT-PCR and analyzed in embryonated chicken eggs for infectious virus.

resultsH7N2 virus was detected by RT-PCR in 28 of 29 aerosol samples collected in the high-risk isolation (hot) zone with 70.9% on particles with aerodynamic diameters >4 μm, 27.7% in 1-4 μm, and 1.4% in <1 μm. Seventeen of 22 surface samples from the high-risk isolation zone were also H7N2 positive with an average M1 copy number of 1.3 × 10

conclusionsBy measuring particle size, distribution, and infectivity, our study suggests that the A(H7N2) virus had the potential to spread by airborne transmission and/or direct contact with viral-laden fomites. These results warranted continued A(H7N2) surveillance and transmission-based precautions during the treatment and care of infected cats.

Indexed as

Disease OutbreaksEnvironmental MicrobiologyQuarantineAnimalsCat DiseasesCatsInfluenza A Virus, H7N2 SubtypeNew York CityOccupational ExposureOrthomyxoviridae InfectionsRisk AssessmentVeterinary MedicineZoonosesAerosol samplinginfluenza A(H7N2)surface samplingtransmission

Identifiers

PMID29768714
PMCPMC6086858
OpenAlexW2803898578

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.