Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29735672›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2018

Strategic investment explains patterns of cooperation and cheating in a microbe.

Philip G Madgwick, Balint Stewart, Laurence J Belcher, Christopher R L Thompson, Jason B Wolf

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 20 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
20citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

20 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Review
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Molecular patterns and processes in evolving sociality: lessons from insects.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2023
    Review
  11. Developmental constraints enforce altruism and avert the tragedy of the commons in a social microbe.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2022
    Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
  15. Review
  16. Article
  17. Evolution of strategic cooperation.Evolution letters · 2020
    Article
  18. Article
  19. WildEcology and evolution · 2020
    Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Philip G MadgwickMilner Centre for Evolution, Department of Biology and Biochemistry, University of Bath, Claverton Down, BA2 7AY Bath, United Kingdom.
Balint StewartCentre for Life's Origins and Evolution, Department of Genetics, Evolution and Environment, University College London, WC1E 6BT London, United Kingdom.ORCID 0000-0003-2806-5503
Laurence J BelcherMilner Centre for Evolution, Department of Biology and Biochemistry, University of Bath, Claverton Down, BA2 7AY Bath, United Kingdom.
Christopher R L ThompsonCentre for Life's Origins and Evolution, Department of Genetics, Evolution and Environment, University College London, WC1E 6BT London, United Kingdom christopher.thompson@ucl.ac.uk jason@evolutionarygenetics.org.
Jason B WolfMilner Centre for Evolution, Department of Biology and Biochemistry, University of Bath, Claverton Down, BA2 7AY Bath, United Kingdom; christopher.thompson@ucl.ac.uk jason@evolutionarygenetics.org.

Funding

Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council BB/M007146/1Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council BB/M01035X/1Wellcome TrustWellcome Trust WT095643AIA
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Contributing to cooperation is typically costly, while its rewards are often available to all members of a social group. So why should individuals be willing to pay these costs, especially if they could cheat by exploiting the investments of others? Kin selection theory broadly predicts that individuals should invest more into cooperation if their relatedness to group members is high (assuming they can discriminate kin from nonkin). To better understand how relatedness affects cooperation, we derived the ‟Collective Investment" game, which provides quantitative predictions for patterns of strategic investment depending on the level of relatedness. We then tested these predictions by experimentally manipulating relatedness (genotype frequencies) in mixed cooperative aggregations of the social amoeba

Indexed as

Biological EvolutionCooperative BehaviorGame TheoryModels, BiologicalDictyosteliumIndividualitySpores, Protozoancheatingconflictcooperationgame theorykin selection

Identifiers

PMID29735672
PMCPMC6003509

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.