ArticleBMC infectious diseases2018
Planning for globally coordinated cessation of bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine: risks of non-synchronous cessation and unauthorized oral poliovirus vaccine use.
Article in BMC infectious diseases, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
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Who cites it
11 citing papers in PubMed, 11 citations in OpenAlex.
- Increasing Population Immunity Prior to Globally-Coordinated Cessation of Bivalent Oral Poliovirus Vaccine (bOPV).Pathogens (Basel, Switzerland) · 2024Article
- Coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine use: Options and potential consequences.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2024Review
- Worst-case scenarios: Modeling uncontrolled type 2 polio transmission.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2024Article
- Expected Implications of Globally Coordinated Cessation of Serotype 3 Oral Poliovirus Vaccine (OPV) Before Serotype 1 OPV.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2021Article
- Reflections on Modeling Poliovirus Transmission and the Polio Eradication Endgame.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2021Review
- Health and Economic Outcomes Associated with Polio Vaccine Policy Options: 2019-2029.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2021Article
- Updated Characterization of Post-OPV Cessation Risks: Lessons from 2019 Serotype 2 Outbreaks and Implications for the Probability of OPV Restart.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2021Review
- Review of poliovirus modeling performed from 2000 to 2019 to support global polio eradication.Expert review of vaccines · 2020Review
- Updated modelling of the prevalence of immunodeficiency-associated long-term vaccine-derived poliovirus (iVDPV) excreters.Epidemiology and infection · 2019Article
- Logistical challenges and assumptions for modeling the failure of global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV).Expert review of vaccines · 2019Review
- Polio endgame risks and the possibility of restarting the use of oral poliovirus vaccine.Expert review of vaccines · 2018Review
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
3 authors at 3 institutions in 2 countries.
Funding
Abstract
backgroundOral polio vaccine (OPV) containing attenuated serotype 2 polioviruses was globally withdrawn in 2016, and bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing attenuated serotype 1 and 3 polioviruses needs to be withdrawn after the certification of eradication of all wild polioviruses to eliminate future risks from vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). To minimize risks from VDPVs, the planning and implementation of bOPV withdrawal should build on the experience with withdrawing OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses while taking into account similarities and differences between the three poliovirus serotypes.
methodsWe explored the risks from (i) a failure to synchronize OPV cessation and (ii) unauthorized post-cessation OPV use for serotypes 1 and 3 in the context of globally-coordinated future bOPV cessation and compared the results to similar analyses for serotype 2 OPV cessation.
resultsWhile the risks associated with a failure to synchronize cessation and unauthorized post-cessation OPV use appear to be substantially lower for serotype 3 polioviruses than for serotype 2 polioviruses, the risks for serotype 1 appear similar to those for serotype 2. Increasing population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus transmission using pre-cessation bOPV supplemental immunization activities and inactivated poliovirus vaccine in routine immunization reduces the risks of circulating VDPVs associated with non-synchronized cessation or unauthorized OPV use.
conclusionsThe Global Polio Eradication Initiative should synchronize global bOPV cessation during a similar window of time as occurred for the global cessation of OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses and should rigorously verify the absence of bOPV in immunization systems after its cessation.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.