Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29494627›Full record

ArticlePloS one2018

Clout, activists and budget: The road to presidency.

Lucas Böttcher, Hans J Herrmann, Hans Gersbach

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
3.1field-weighted citation impact, top 8% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed, 25 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors at 2 institutions in 2 countries.

Lucas BöttcherETH Zurich, Wolfgang-Pauli-Strasse 27, CH-8093 Zurich, Switzerland.ORCID 0000-0003-1700-1897
Hans J HerrmannETH Zurich, Wolfgang-Pauli-Strasse 27, CH-8093 Zurich, Switzerland.
Hans GersbachETH Zurich, Zürichbergstrasse 18, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland.
ETH Zurich · CHUniversidade Federal do Ceará · BR

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Political campaigns involve, in the simplest case, two competing campaign groups which try to obtain a majority of votes. We propose a novel mathematical framework to study political campaign dynamics on social networks whose constituents are either political activists or persuadable individuals. Activists are convinced and do not change their opinion and they are able to move around in the social network to motivate persuadable individuals to vote according to their opinion. We describe the influence of the complex interplay between the number of activists, political clout, budgets, and campaign costs on the campaign result. We also identify situations where the choice of one campaign group to send a certain number of activists already pre-determines their victory. Moreover, we show that a candidate's advantage in terms of political clout can overcome a substantial budget disadvantage or a lower number of activists, as illustrated by the US presidential election 2016.

Indexed as

PoliticsBudgetsChoice BehaviorHumansModels, Theoretical

Identifiers

PMID29494627
PMCPMC5832241
OpenAlexW2786633371

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.