Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29416030›Full record

ArticleNature communications2018

Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness.

Johannes G Reiter, Christian Hilbe, David G Rand, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Martin A Nowak

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Nature communications, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 13 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
13citing papers in PubMed
11.3field-weighted citation impact, top 2% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

13 citing papers in PubMed, 48 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Promoters of cooperation in evolutionary games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  2. Article
  3. Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Evolving cooperation in multichannel games.Nature communications · 2020
    Article
  11. Article
  12. Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2018
    Article
  13. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors at 3 institutions in 2 countries.

Johannes G ReiterProgram for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0170-7353
Christian HilbeIST Austria (Institute of Science and Technology Austria), Klosterneuburg, 3400, Austria.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5116-955X
David G RandYale Institute for Network Science and Department of Psychology and Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06520, USA.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8975-2783
Krishnendu ChatterjeeIST Austria (Institute of Science and Technology Austria), Klosterneuburg, 3400, Austria.
Martin A NowakProgram for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA. martin_nowak@harvard.edu.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5489-0908
Harvard University · USInstitute of Science and Technology Austria · ATYale University · US

Funding

European Research Council 279307
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation among humans. Many of our daily interactions are repeated. We interact repeatedly with our family, friends, colleagues, members of the local and even global community. In the theory of repeated games, it is a tacit assumption that the various games that a person plays simultaneously have no effect on each other. Here we introduce a general framework that allows us to analyze "crosstalk" between a player's concurrent games. In the presence of crosstalk, the action a person experiences in one game can alter the person's decision in another. We find that crosstalk impedes the maintenance of cooperation and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. The magnitude of the effect depends on the population structure. In more densely connected social groups, crosstalk has a stronger effect. A harsh retaliator, such as Tit-for-Tat, is unable to counteract crosstalk. The crosstalk framework provides a unified interpretation of direct and upstream reciprocity in the context of repeated games.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorForgivenessGame TheoryInterpersonal RelationsAlgorithmsComputer SimulationHumansModels, PsychologicalPrisoner Dilemma

Identifiers

PMID29416030
PMCPMC5803203
OpenAlexW2800904727

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.