ArticleJournal of health economics2017
Imperfect risk adjustment, risk preferences, and sorting in competitive health insurance markets.
Article in Journal of health economics, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Who cites it
8 citing papers in PubMed.
- Research trends in contemporary health economics: a scientometric analysis on collective content of specialty journals.Health economics review · 2024Review
- The pattern of health insurance economic resilience in the Covid 19 pandemic shock.BMC research notes · 2021Article
- Paying Medicare Advantage plans: To level or tilt the playing field.Journal of health economics · 2017Article
- Measuring efficiency of health plan payment systems in managed competition health insurance markets.Journal of health economics · 2017Article
- Demand heterogeneity in insurance markets: Implications for equity and efficiency.Quantitative economics · 2017Article
- Technological Change and Risk Adjustment: Benefit Design Incentives in Medicare Part D.American economic journal. Economic policy · 2017Article
- RISK CORRIDORS AND REINSURANCE IN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES: Insurance for Insurers.American journal of health economics · 2016Article
- Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies.The journal of economic perspectives : a journal of the American Economic AssociationArticle
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
1 author.
Funding
Abstract
I develop a model of insurer price-setting and consumer welfare under risk-adjustment, a policy commonly used to combat inefficient sorting due to adverse selection in health insurance markets. I use the model to illustrate graphically that risk-adjustment causes health plan prices to be based on costs not predicted by the risk-adjustment model ("residual costs") rather than total costs, either weakening or exacerbating selection problems depending on the correlation between demand and costs predicted by the risk-adjustment model. I then use a structural model to estimate the welfare consequences of risk-adjustment, finding a welfare gain of over $600 per person-year.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.