ArticleJournal of health economics2017
Measuring efficiency of health plan payment systems in managed competition health insurance markets.
Article in Journal of health economics, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 18 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
18 citing papers in PubMed.
- The dis-economy of precision medicine: how stratification multiplies social tension in healthcare systems.Medicine, health care, and philosophy · 2026Article
- Ex ante evaluation of risk adjustment models for prospective provider payment: a conceptual framework and empirical application.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026Article
- A critical review of the use of RThe European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2025Review
- A framework for ex-ante evaluation of the potential effects of risk equalization and risk sharing in health insurance markets with regulated competition.Health economics review · 2024Review
- Scope and Incentives for Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets With Regulated Competition: A Conceptual Framework and International Comparison.Medical care research and review : MCRR · 2024Review
- Research trends in contemporary health economics: a scientometric analysis on collective content of specialty journals.Health economics review · 2024Review
- The Two-Margin Problem in Insurance Markets.The review of economics and statistics · 2023Article
- How to deal with persistently low/high spenders in health plan payment systems?Health economics · 2022Article
- Virtual Simulation Design Facing Smart Payment Screen on the Background of Artificial Intelligence.Applied bionics and biomechanics · 2022Article
- Improving the Performance of Risk Adjustment Systems: Constrained Regressions, Reinsurance, and Variable Selection.American journal of health economics · 2021Article
- Selection Incentives for Health Insurers in the Presence of Sophisticated Risk Adjustment.Medical care research and review : MCRR · 2020Article
- Fair regression for health care spending.Biometrics · 2020Article
- Incorporating self-reported health measures in risk equalization through constrained regression.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2020Article
- Modest risk-sharing significantly reduces health plans' incentives for service distortion.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2019Article
- Screening in Contract Design: Evidence from the ACA Health Insurance Exchanges.American economic journal. Economic policy · 2019Article
- Risk equalization in competitive health insurance markets: Identifying healthy individuals on the basis of multiple-year low spending.Health services research · 2019Article
- Limitations of P-Values and R-squared for Stepwise Regression Building: A Fairness Demonstration in Health Policy Risk Adjustment.The American statistician · 2019Article
- Imperfect risk adjustment, risk preferences, and sorting in competitive health insurance markets.Journal of health economics · 2017Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
Abstract
Adverse selection in health insurance markets leads to two types of inefficiency. On the demand side, adverse selection leads to plan price distortions resulting in inefficient sorting of consumers across health plans. On the supply side, adverse selection creates incentives for plans to inefficiently distort benefits to attract profitable enrollees. Reinsurance, risk adjustment, and premium categories address these problems. Building on prior research on health plan payment system evaluation, we develop measures of the efficiency consequences of price and benefit distortions under a given payment system. Our measures are based on explicit economic models of insurer behavior under adverse selection, incorporate multiple features of plan payment systems, and can be calculated prior to observing actual insurer and consumer behavior. We illustrate the use of these measures with data from a simulated market for individual health insurance.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.