Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29190280›Full record

ArticlePloS one2017

From rationality to cooperativeness: The totally mixed Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.

Ivan S Menshikov, Alexsandr V Shklover, Tatiana S Babkina, Mikhail G Myagkov

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Ivan S MenshikovDepartment of Control and Applied Mathematics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (State University), Moscow, Moscow Region, Russian Federation.
Alexsandr V ShkloverDepartment of Control and Applied Mathematics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (State University), Moscow, Moscow Region, Russian Federation.
Tatiana S BabkinaDepartment of Control and Applied Mathematics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (State University), Moscow, Moscow Region, Russian Federation.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0504-2643
Mikhail G MyagkovLaboratory of Experimental Methods in Cognitive and Social Sciences, Tomsk State University, Tomsk, Tomsk Region, Russian Federation.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In this research, the social behavior of the participants in a Prisoner's Dilemma laboratory game is explained on the basis of the quantal response equilibrium concept and the representation of the game in Markov strategies. In previous research, we demonstrated that social interaction during the experiment has a positive influence on cooperation, trust, and gratefulness. This research shows that the quantal response equilibrium concept agrees only with the results of experiments on cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma prior to social interaction. However, quantal response equilibrium does not explain of participants' behavior after social interaction. As an alternative theoretical approach, an examination was conducted of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game in Markov strategies. We built a totally mixed Nash equilibrium in this game; the equilibrium agrees with the results of the experiments both before and after social interaction.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorMarkov ChainsPrisoner DilemmaFemaleHumansInterpersonal RelationsMale

Identifiers

PMID29190280
PMCPMC5708610

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.