Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29145458›Full record

ArticlePloS one2017

A model-guided symbolic execution approach for network protocol implementations and vulnerability detection.

Shameng Wen, Qingkun Meng, Chao Feng, Chaojing Tang

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Shameng WenCollege of Electronic Science and Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8780-9870
Qingkun MengCollege of Electronic Science and Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China.
Chao FengCollege of Electronic Science and Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China.
Chaojing TangCollege of Electronic Science and Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Formal techniques have been devoted to analyzing whether network protocol specifications violate security policies; however, these methods cannot detect vulnerabilities in the implementations of the network protocols themselves. Symbolic execution can be used to analyze the paths of the network protocol implementations, but for stateful network protocols, it is difficult to reach the deep states of the protocol. This paper proposes a novel model-guided approach to detect vulnerabilities in network protocol implementations. Our method first abstracts a finite state machine (FSM) model, then utilizes the model to guide the symbolic execution. This approach achieves high coverage of both the code and the protocol states. The proposed method is implemented and applied to test numerous real-world network protocol implementations. The experimental results indicate that the proposed method is more effective than traditional fuzzing methods such as SPIKE at detecting vulnerabilities in the deep states of network protocol implementations.

Indexed as

Models, TheoreticalFuzzy Logic

Identifiers

PMID29145458
PMCPMC5690638

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.