Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29089600›Full record

ReviewThe Journal of antibiotics2017

Incentivising innovation in antibiotic drug discovery and development: progress, challenges and next steps.

Victoria L Simpkin, Matthew J Renwick, Ruth Kelly, Elias Mossialos

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in The Journal of antibiotics, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 82 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
82citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

82 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
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  6. Article
  7. Review
  8. Netupitant Exhibits Potent Activity onACS infectious diseases · 2025
    Article
  9. Article
  10. Review
  11. Review
  12. Article
  13. Macro- and micro-influencers of antimicrobial costs…What do stewardship programs need to know?Antimicrobial stewardship & healthcare epidemiology : ASHE · 2025
    Article
  14. Review
  15. Article
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  20. Article

22 more citing papers are in PubMed but not listed here.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Victoria L SimpkinDepartment of Health Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Matthew J RenwickDepartment of Health Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Ruth KellyDepartment of Health Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Elias MossialosDepartment of Health Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Political momentum and funding for combatting antimicrobial resistance (AMR) continues to build. Numerous major international and national initiatives aimed at financially incentivising the research and development (R&D) of antibiotics have been implemented. However, it remains unclear how to effectively strengthen the current set of incentive programmes to further accelerate antibiotic innovation. Based on a literature review and expert input, this study first identifies and assesses the major international, European Union, US and UK antibiotic R&D funding programmes. These programmes are then evaluated across market and public health criteria necessary for comprehensively improving the antibiotic market. The current set of incentive programmes are an important initial step to improving the economic feasibility of antibiotic development. However, there appears to be a lack of global coordination across all initiatives, which risks duplicating efforts, leaving funding gaps in the value chain and overlooking important AMR goals. This study finds that incentive programmes are overly committed to early-stage push funding of basic science and preclinical research, while there is limited late-stage push funding of clinical development. Moreover, there are almost no pull incentives to facilitate transition of antibiotic products from early clinical phases to commercialisation, focus developer concentration on the highest priority antibiotics and attract large pharmaceutical companies to invest in the market. Finally, it seems that antibiotic sustainability and patient access requirements are poorly integrated into the array of incentive mechanisms.

Indexed as

Anti-Bacterial AgentsCapital FinancingDrug DiscoveryDrug IndustryDrug Resistance, BacterialGovernment ProgramsHumansPublic HealthAnti-Bacterial Agents

Identifiers

PMID29089600
PMCPMC5746591

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY-NC-SA
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.