Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29085255›Full record

ArticleJournal of geographical systems2017

Geospatial cryptography: enabling researchers to access private, spatially referenced, human subjects data for cancer control and prevention.

Geoffrey M Jacquez, Aleksander Essex, Andrew Curtis, Betsy Kohler, Recinda Sherman, Khaled El Emam, Chen Shi, Andy Kaufmann, Linda Beale, Thomas Cusick and 2 more

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of geographical systems, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

12 authors.

Geoffrey M JacquezDepartment of Geography, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, USA.
Aleksander EssexDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Western University, London, ON, Canada.
Andrew CurtisDepartment of Geography, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA.
Betsy KohlerNorth American Association of Central Cancer Registries, Springfield, IL, USA.
Recinda ShermanNorth American Association of Central Cancer Registries, Springfield, IL, USA.
Khaled El EmamFaculty of Medicine, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada.
Chen ShiDepartment of Geography, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, USA.
Andy KaufmannBioMedware, Ann Arbor, MI, USA.
Linda BealeEsri, Redlands, CA, USA.
Thomas CusickDepartment of Mathematics, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, USA.
Daniel GoldbergDepartment of Geography, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA.
Pierre GoovaertsBioMedware, Ann Arbor, MI, USA.

Funding

Case-only Cancer Clustering for Mobile PopulationsR44CA135818 · NCI · BIOMEDWARE · PI JACQUEZ, GEOFFREY M. · 2009 to 2010
$878k
Exploratory evaluation of homomorphic cryptography for confidentiality protectionR21LM011132 · NLM · BIOMEDWARE · PI JACQUEZ, GEOFFREY M. · 2012 to 2013
$371k
NCI NIH HHS R44 CA135818NLM NIH HHS R21 LM011132
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

As the volume, accuracy and precision of digital geographic information have increased, concerns regarding individual privacy and confidentiality have come to the forefront. Not only do these challenge a basic tenet underlying the advancement of science by posing substantial obstacles to the sharing of data to validate research results, but they are obstacles to conducting certain research projects in the first place. Geospatial cryptography involves the specification, design, implementation and application of cryptographic techniques to address privacy, confidentiality and security concerns for geographically referenced data. This article defines geospatial cryptography and demonstrates its application in cancer control and surveillance. Four use cases are considered: (1) national-level de-duplication among state or province-based cancer registries; (2) sharing of confidential data across cancer registries to support case aggregation across administrative geographies; (3) secure data linkage; and (4) cancer cluster investigation and surveillance. A secure multi-party system for geospatial cryptography is developed. Solutions under geospatial cryptography are presented and computation time is calculated. As services provided by cancer registries to the research community, de-duplication, case aggregation across administrative geographies and secure data linkage are often time-consuming and in some instances precluded by confidentiality and security concerns. Geospatial cryptography provides secure solutions that hold significant promise for addressing these concerns and for accelerating the pace of research with human subjects data residing in our nation's cancer registries. Pursuit of the research directions posed herein conceivably would lead to a geospatially encrypted geographic information system (GEGIS) designed specifically to promote the sharing and spatial analysis of confidential data. Geospatial cryptography holds substantial promise for accelerating the pace of research with spatially referenced human subjects data.

Indexed as

Geographic information scienceGeospatial cryptographyHuman subjects researchPrivacySpatial methods

Identifiers

PMID29085255
PMCPMC5659297

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.