Evidence map›Paper›PMID 29040058›Full record

ArticleVector borne and zoonotic diseases (Larchmont, N.Y.)2018

Recommendations for Laboratory Containment and Management of Gene Drive Systems in Arthropods.

Mark Q Benedict, Austin Burt, Margareth L Capurro, Paul De Barro, Alfred M Handler, Keith R Hayes, John M Marshall, Walter J Tabachnick, Zach N Adelman

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Vector borne and zoonotic diseases (Larchmont, N.Y.), 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 26 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
26citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

26 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. The ethics of genome editing in non-human animals: a systematic review of reasons reported in the academic literature.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2019
    Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. CRISPR/Cas9-based split homing gene drive targetingProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023
    Article
  5. Article
  6. Review
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Making gene drive biodegradable.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Article
  14. Article
  15. Article
  16. A Cross-Sectional Survey of Biosafety Professionals Regarding Genetically Modified Insects.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2020
    Article
  17. Review
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

9 authors.

Mark Q Benedict1 Entomology Branch, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia .
Austin Burt2 Life Sciences, Imperial College London , Ascot, United Kingdom .
Margareth L Capurro3 Department of Parasitology, Institute of Biomedical Sciences, University of Sao Paulo , Sao Paulo, Brazil .
Paul De Barro5 CSIRO , Brisbane, Australia .
Alfred M Handler6 USDA-ARS, Center for Medical, Agricultural, and Veterinary Entomology , Gainesville, Florida.
Keith R Hayes7 CSIRO , Hobart, Australia .
John M Marshall8 Divisions of Biostatistics and Epidemiology, School of Public Health, University of California , Berkeley, California.
Walter J Tabachnick9 Florida Medical Entomology Laboratory, Department of Entomology and Nematology, University of Florida , Vero Beach, Florida.
Zach N Adelman10 Department of Entomology, Texas A&M University , College Station, Texas.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Versatile molecular tools for creating driving transgenes and other invasive genetic factors present regulatory, ethical, and environmental challenges that should be addressed to ensure their safe use. In this article, we discuss driving transgenes and invasive genetic factors that can potentially spread after their introduction into a small proportion of individuals in a population. The potential of invasive genetic factors to increase their number in natural populations presents challenges that require additional safety measures not provided by previous recommendations regarding accidental release of arthropods. In addition to providing physical containment, invasive genetic factors require greater attention to strain management, including their distribution and identity confirmation. In this study, we focus on insects containing such factors with recommendations for investigators who are creating them, institutional biosafety committees charged with ensuring safety, funding agencies providing support, those managing insectaries handling these materials who are responsible for containment, and other persons who will be receiving insects-transgenic or not-from these facilities. We give specific examples of efforts to modify mosquitoes for mosquito-borne disease control, but similar considerations are relevant to other arthropods that are important to human health, the environment, and agriculture.

Indexed as

Animals, Genetically ModifiedGene Drive TechnologyAnimalsArthropodsCulicidaeInsect VectorsMosquito ControlTransgenesbiosafetygene drivemosquitoestransgenic organism

Identifiers

PMID29040058
PMCPMC5846571

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.