Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28934258›Full record

Observational studyPloS one2017

Reports of unintended consequences of financial incentives to improve management of hypertension.

Sylvia J Hysong, Richard SoRelle, Kristen Broussard Smitham, Laura A Petersen

Registry-linked trialAbstract readMulticenter StudyObservational Study
In one paragraph

Observational study in PloS one, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. It is linked to trial NCT00302718 (RCT of Financial Incentives to Translate ALLHAT Into Practice), which is not on this map. Cited by 11 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

NCT00302718 nacompletednot on this map

RCT of Financial Incentives to Translate ALLHAT Into Practice

TypeinterventionalSponsorVA Office of Research and DevelopmentRan2007 to 2012Enrolled83ConditionsHypertensionArmsPhysician-level financial incentives, Practice-level financial incentives, Physician- and practice-level financial incentives
3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Sylvia J HysongHouston VA HSR&D Center for Innovations in Quality, Effectiveness and Safety, Michael E. DeBakey VA Medical Center, Houston, Texas, United States of America.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9063-5207
Richard SoRelleVISN 4 Center for Evaluation of PACT (CEPACT), Corporal Michael J. Crescenz VA Medical Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America.
Kristen Broussard SmithamHouston VA HSR&D Center for Innovations in Quality, Effectiveness and Safety, Michael E. DeBakey VA Medical Center, Houston, Texas, United States of America.
Laura A PetersenHouston VA HSR&D Center for Innovations in Quality, Effectiveness and Safety, Michael E. DeBakey VA Medical Center, Houston, Texas, United States of America.

Funding

Financial Incentives to Translate ALLHAT into PracticeR01HL079173 · NHLBI · BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE · PI PETERSEN, LAURA A · 2005 to 2011
$3.3M
NHLBI NIH HHS R01 HL079173
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundGiven the increase in financial-incentive programs nationwide, many physicians and physician groups are concerned about potential unintended consequences of providing financial incentives to improve quality of care. However, few studies examine whether actual unintended consequences result from providing financial incentives to physicians. We sought to document the extent to which the unintended consequences discussed in the literature were observable in a randomized clinical trial (RCT) of financial incentives.

methodsWe conducted a qualitative observational study nested within a larger RCT of financial incentives to improve hypertension care. We conducted 30-minute telephone interviews with primary care personnel at facilities participating in the RCT housed at12 geographically dispersed Veterans Affairs Medical Centers nationwide. Participants answered questions about unintended effects, clinic team dynamics, organizational impact on care delivery, study participation. We employed a blend of inductive and deductive qualitative techniques for analysis.

participantsSixty-five participants were recruited from RCT enrollees and personnel not enrolled in the larger RCT, plus one primary care leader per site.

resultsEmergent themes included possible patient harm, emphasis on documentation over improving care, reduced professional morale, and positive spillover. All discussions of unintended consequences involving patient harm were only concerns, not actual events. Several unintended consequences concerned ancillary initiatives for quality improvement (e.g., practice guidelines and performance measurement systems) rather than financial incentives.

conclusionsMany unintended consequences of financial incentives noted were either only concerns or attributable to ancillary quality-improvement initiatives. Actual unintended consequences included improved documentation of care without necessarily improving actual care, and positive unintended consequences.

trial registrationClinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT00302718.

Indexed as

Reimbursement, IncentiveHealth PersonnelHumansHypertensionInterviews as TopicPatient Care TeamPhysician Incentive PlansPrimary Health CareUnited StatesUnited States Department of Veterans Affairs

Identifiers

PMID28934258
PMCPMC5608267

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Registered trials

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.