Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28919941›Full record

ArticleCommunicative & integrative biology2017

A test of the submentalizing hypothesis: Apes' performance in a false belief task inanimate control.

Christopher Krupenye, Fumihiro Kano, Satoshi Hirata, Josep Call, Michael Tomasello

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Communicative & integrative biology, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 13 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
13citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

13 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Human and nonhuman norms: a dimensional framework.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2024
    Article
  4. Review
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Review
  9. Review
  10. Review
  11. Review
  12. Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent's action in a false-belief test.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2019
    Article
  13. How children come to understand false beliefs: A shared intentionality account.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2018
    Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Christopher KrupenyeDepartment of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.
Fumihiro KanoKumamoto Sanctuary, Wildlife Research Center, Kyoto University, Kumamoto, Japan.
Satoshi HirataKumamoto Sanctuary, Wildlife Research Center, Kyoto University, Kumamoto, Japan.
Josep CallDepartment of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.
Michael TomaselloDepartment of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Much debate concerns whether any nonhuman animals share with humans the ability to infer others' mental states, such as desires and beliefs. In a recent eye-tracking false-belief task, we showed that great apes correctly anticipated that a human actor would search for a goal object where he had last seen it, even though the apes themselves knew that it was no longer there. In response, Heyes proposed that apes' looking behavior was guided not by social cognitive mechanisms but rather domain-general cueing effects, and suggested the use of inanimate controls to test this alternative submentalizing hypothesis. In the present study, we implemented the suggested inanimate control of our previous false-belief task. Apes attended well to key events but showed markedly fewer anticipatory looks and no significant tendency to look to the correct location. We thus found no evidence that submentalizing was responsible for apes' anticipatory looks in our false-belief task.

Indexed as

cognitive evolutionfalse belief understandinggreat apementalizingsocial cognitionsubmentalizingtheory of mind

Identifiers

PMID28919941
PMCPMC5595417

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.