ArticleEurope's journal of psychology2017
There Is an 'Unconscious,' but It May Well Be Conscious.
Article in Europe's journal of psychology, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed, 13 citations in OpenAlex.
- From Subliminality, to the Unconscious Mind: Philosophical Lineages, Evolutionary Paradoxes, and the Future of the Origins of the Unconscious.Integrative psychological & behavioral science · 2026Article
- What is groundwater?Hydrogeology journal · 2026Article
- The collapse of the wave function as the mediator of free will in prime neurons.Frontiers in neuroscience · 2025Article
- Indicators and Criteria of Consciousness in Animals and Intelligent Machines: An Inside-Out Approach.Frontiers in systems neuroscience · 2019Article
- The ethical relevance of the unconscious.Philosophy, ethics, and humanities in medicine : PEHM · 2017Review
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
1 author at 1 institution in 1 country.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called "meta-consciousness" in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an "unconscious." The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for gauging awareness. After re-interpreting the empirical data according to a philosophically rigorous definition of consciousness, I show that two well-known phenomena corroborate this hypothesis: (a) experiences that, despite being conscious, aren't re-represented during introspection; and (b) dissociated experiences inaccessible to the executive ego. If consciousness is inherent to all mentation, it may be fundamental in nature, as opposed to a product of particular types of brain function.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.