ArticleHuman nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.)2017
Self-Interest and the Design of Rules.
Article in Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.), 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 18 papers.
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Who cites it
18 citing papers in PubMed.
- Institutionalised Commitment and Its Origins.Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.) · 2026Article
- The "I" in egalitarianism: Hadza hunter-gatherers averse to inequality primarily when personally unfavorable.PNAS nexus · 2026Article
- Cultural evolution: Where we have been and where we are going (maybe).Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Sex ratios and gender norms: why both are needed to understand sexual conflict in humans.Evolutionary human sciences · 2024Review
- Playing the political game: the coevolution of institutions with group size and political inequality.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2023Article
- Universality, domain-specificity, and development of psychological responses to music.Nature reviews psychology · 2023Article
- Validating the dual evolutionary foundations of political values in a US sample.Frontiers in psychology · 2023Article
- Norm violations and punishments across human societies.Evolutionary human sciences · 2023Article
- Variations in limited resources allocation towards friends and strangers in children and adolescents from seven economically and culturally diverse societies.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Four levers of reciprocity across human societies: concepts, analysis and predictions.Evolutionary human sciences · 2022Review
- Authority matters: propaganda and the coevolution of behaviour and attitudes.Evolutionary human sciences · 2022Article
- Disguises and the Origins of Clothing.Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.) · 2021Article
- Tempo and Mode in Cultural Macroevolution.Evolutionary psychology : an international journal of evolutionary approaches to psychology and behavior · 2021Article
- The cultural evolution and ecology of institutions.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Article
- Beyond social learning.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021Review
- Human large-scale cooperation as a product of competition between cultural groups.Nature communications · 2020Article
- Cultural group selection and human cooperation: a conceptual and empirical review.Evolutionary human sciences · 2020Review
- Why do religious leaders observe costly prohibitions? Examining taboos on Mentawai shamans.Evolutionary human sciences · 2020Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Rules regulating social behavior raise challenging questions about cultural evolution in part because they frequently confer group-level benefits. Current multilevel selection theories contend that between-group processes interact with within-group processes to produce norms and institutions, but within-group processes have remained underspecified, leading to a recent emphasis on cultural group selection as the primary driver of cultural design. Here we present the self-interested enforcement (SIE) hypothesis, which proposes that the design of rules importantly reflects the relative enforcement capacities of competing parties. We show that, in addition to explaining patterns in cultural change and stability, SIE can account for the emergence of much group-functional culture. We outline how this process can stifle or accelerate cultural group selection, depending on various social conditions. Self-interested enforcement has important bearings on the emergence, stability, and change of rules.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.