Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28838162›Full record

ArticleThe Journal of infectious diseases2017

Monitoring and Validation of the Global Replacement of tOPV with bOPV, April-May 2016.

Margaret Farrell, Lee M Hampton, Stephanie Shendale, Lisa Menning, Alejandro Ramirez Gonzalez, Julie Garon, Samantha B Dolan, Gaël Maufras du Châtellier, Sarah Wanyoike, Diana Chang Blanc and 1 more

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in The Journal of infectious diseases, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
10citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

10 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Article
  3. A Health Economic Analysis for Oral Poliovirus Vaccine to Prevent COVID-19 in the United States.Risk analysis : an official publication of the Society for Risk Analysis · 2021
    Review
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

11 authors.

Margaret FarrellUNICEF Program Division, New York.
Lee M HamptonGlobal Immunization Division, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Stephanie ShendaleExpanded Programme on Immunization, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
Lisa MenningExpanded Programme on Immunization, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
Alejandro Ramirez GonzalezExpanded Programme on Immunization, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
Julie GaronEmory University, Atlanta, Georgia.
Samantha B DolanGlobal Immunization Division, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.
Gaël Maufras du ChâtellierWest and Central Africa Regional Office, UNICEF,Dakar, Senegal.
Sarah WanyoikeTask Force for Global Health, Atlanta, Georgia.
Diana Chang BlancExpanded Programme on Immunization, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
Manish M PatelTask Force for Global Health, Atlanta, Georgia.

Funding

World Health Organization 001
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The phased withdrawal of oral polio vaccine (OPV) associated with the Polio Eradication and Endgame Strategic Plan 2013-2018 began with the synchronized global replacement of trivalent OPV (tOPV) with bivalent OPV (bOPV) during April - May 2016, a transition referred to as the "switch." The World Health Organization's (WHO) Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) on Immunization recommended conducting this synchronized switch in all 155 OPV-using countries and territories (which collectively administered several hundred million doses of tOPV each year via several hundred thousand facilities) to reduce risks of re-emergence of vaccine-derived polioviruses. Safe execution of this switch required implementation of an associated independent monitoring strategy, the primary objective of which was verification that tOPV was no longer available for administration post-switch. This strategy had to be both practical and rigorous such that tOPV withdrawal could be reasonably employed and confirmed in all countries and territories within a discreet timeframe. Following these principles, WHO recommended that designated monitors in each of the 155 countries and territories visit all vaccine stores as well as a 10% sample of highest-risk health facilities within two weeks of the national switch date, removing any tOPV vials found. National governments were required to provide the WHO with formal validation of execution and monitoring of the switch. In practice, all countries reported cessation of tOPV by 12 May 2016 and 95% of countries and territories submitted detailed monitoring data to WHO. According to these data, 272 out of 276 (99%) national stores, 3,741 out of 3.968 (94%) regional stores, 16,144 out of 22,372 (72%) district level stores, and 143,050 out of 595,401 (24%) of health facilities were monitored. These data, along with field reports suggest that monitoring and validation of the switch was efficient and effective, and that the strategies used during the process could be adapted to future stages of OPV withdrawal.

Indexed as

Poliovirus Vaccine, OralDisease EradicationDrug SubstitutionGlobal HealthHumansPoliomyelitisPublic Health SurveillancePoliovirus Vaccine, OraleradicationmonitoringOPVpolioswitch

Identifiers

PMID28838162
PMCPMC5853513

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.