Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28786361›Full record

ArticleBMC medical genomics2017

BLOOM: BLoom filter based oblivious outsourced matchings.

Jan Henrik Ziegeldorf, Jan Pennekamp, David Hellmanns, Felix Schwinger, Ike Kunze, Martin Henze, Jens Hiller, Roman Matzutt, Klaus Wehrle

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in BMC medical genomics, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
3.7field-weighted citation impact, top 5% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed, 26 citations in OpenAlex.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

9 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Jan Henrik ZiegeldorfCommunication and Distributed Systems (COMSYS), RWTH Aachen University, Ahornstrasse 55, Aachen, 52074, Germany. ziegeldorf@comsys.rwth-aachen.de.
Jan PennekampCommunication and Distributed Systems (COMSYS), RWTH Aachen University, Ahornstrasse 55, Aachen, 52074, Germany.
David HellmannsCommunication and Distributed Systems (COMSYS), RWTH Aachen University, Ahornstrasse 55, Aachen, 52074, Germany.
Felix SchwingerCommunication and Distributed Systems (COMSYS), RWTH Aachen University, Ahornstrasse 55, Aachen, 52074, Germany.
Ike KunzeCommunication and Distributed Systems (COMSYS), RWTH Aachen University, Ahornstrasse 55, Aachen, 52074, Germany.
Martin HenzeCommunication and Distributed Systems (COMSYS), RWTH Aachen University, Ahornstrasse 55, Aachen, 52074, Germany.
Jens HillerCommunication and Distributed Systems (COMSYS), RWTH Aachen University, Ahornstrasse 55, Aachen, 52074, Germany.
Roman MatzuttCommunication and Distributed Systems (COMSYS), RWTH Aachen University, Ahornstrasse 55, Aachen, 52074, Germany.
Klaus WehrleCommunication and Distributed Systems (COMSYS), RWTH Aachen University, Ahornstrasse 55, Aachen, 52074, Germany.
RWTH Aachen University · DE

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundWhole genome sequencing has become fast, accurate, and cheap, paving the way towards the large-scale collection and processing of human genome data. Unfortunately, this dawning genome era does not only promise tremendous advances in biomedical research but also causes unprecedented privacy risks for the many. Handling storage and processing of large genome datasets through cloud services greatly aggravates these concerns. Current research efforts thus investigate the use of strong cryptographic methods and protocols to implement privacy-preserving genomic computations.

methodsWe propose FHE-BLOOM and PHE-BLOOM, two efficient approaches for genetic disease testing using homomorphically encrypted Bloom filters. Both approaches allow the data owner to securely outsource storage and computation to an untrusted cloud. FHE-BLOOM is fully secure in the semi-honest model while PHE-BLOOM slightly relaxes security guarantees in a trade-off for highly improved performance.

resultsWe implement and evaluate both approaches on a large dataset of up to 50 patient genomes each with up to 1000000 variations (single nucleotide polymorphisms). For both implementations, overheads scale linearly in the number of patients and variations, while PHE-BLOOM is faster by at least three orders of magnitude. For example, testing disease susceptibility of 50 patients with 100000 variations requires only a total of 308.31 s (σ=8.73 s) with our first approach and a mere 0.07 s (σ=0.00 s) with the second. We additionally discuss security guarantees of both approaches and their limitations as well as possible extensions towards more complex query types, e.g., fuzzy or range queries.

conclusionsBoth approaches handle practical problem sizes efficiently and are easily parallelized to scale with the elastic resources available in the cloud. The fully homomorphic scheme, FHE-BLOOM, realizes a comprehensive outsourcing to the cloud, while the partially homomorphic scheme, PHE-BLOOM, trades a slight relaxation of security guarantees against performance improvements by at least three orders of magnitude.

Indexed as

Computer SecurityOutsourced ServicesDiseaseGenetic TestingGenomicsHumansTime FactorsWhole Genome SequencingBloom filtersHomomorphic encryptionSecure outsourcing

Identifiers

PMID28786361
PMCPMC5547447
OpenAlexW2738375337

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.