Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28785121›Full record

ArticleJournal of public economics2017

Bunching at the kink: implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts.

Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Paul Schrimpf

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of public economics, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Insurance coverage, long-term care utilization, and health outcomes.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2023
    Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It.Journal of the European Economic Association · 2018
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Liran EinavDepartment of Economics, Stanford University, and NBER, leinav@stanford.edu.
Amy FinkelsteinDepartment of Economics, MIT, and NBER, afink@mit.edu.
Paul SchrimpfVancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia, schrimpf@mail.ubc.ca.

Funding

Determinants of Elderly Health: The Role of Place-Based FactorsR37AG032449 · NIA · MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY · PI FINKELSTEIN, AMY N. · 2020 to 2025
$5.9M
The Design of Social Insurance for the Elderly: Public Pensions & Health InsurancR01AG032449 · NIA · NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH · PI EINAV, LIRAN, FINKELSTEIN, AMY N. · 2009 to 2019
$5.6M
NIA NIH HHS R01 AG032449NIA NIH HHS R37 AG032449
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

A large literature in empirical public finance relies on "bunching" to identify a behavioral response to non-linear incentives and to translate this response into an economic object to be used counterfactually. We conduct this type of analysis in the context of prescription drug insurance for the elderly in Medicare Part D, where a kink in the individual's budget set generates substantial bunching in annual drug expenditure around the famous "donut hole". We show that different alternative economic models can match the basic bunching pattern, but have very different quantitative implications for the counterfactual spending response to alternative insurance contracts. These findings illustrate the importance of modeling choices in mapping a compelling reduced form pattern into an economic object of interest.

Indexed as

BunchingHealth careHealth insuranceMedicare

Identifiers

PMID28785121
PMCPMC5544036

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.