Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28717242›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2017

A New Solution Concept for the Ultimatum Game leading to the Golden Ratio.

Stefan Schuster

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
9citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

9 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Insula Sensitivity to Unfairness in Alcohol Use Disorder.Alcohol and alcoholism (Oxford, Oxfordshire) · 2018
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Stefan SchusterFriedrich Schiller University, Dept. of Bioinformatics, Ernst-Abbe-Platz 2, 07743, Jena, Germany. stefan.schu@uni-jena.de.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The Ultimatum Game is a paradigmatic two-player game. A proposer can offer a certain fraction of some valuable good. A responder can accept the offer or reject it, implying that the two players receive nothing. The only subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is to only offer an infinitesimal amount and to accept this. However, this equilibrium is not in agreement with experimental observations, which show varying accepted offers around 40%. While some authors suggest that the fairest split of 50% vs. 50% would be explainable on theoretical grounds or by computer simulation, a few authors (including myself) have recently suggested that the Golden Ratio, about 0.618 vs. about 0.382, would be the solution, in striking agreement with observations. Here we propose a solution concept, based on an optimality approach and epistemic arguments, leading to that suggested solution. The optimality principle is explained both in an axiomatic way and by bargaining arguments, and the relation to Fibonacci numbers is outlined. Our presentation complements the Economic Harmony theory proposed by R. Suleiman and is based on infinite continued fractions. The results are likely to be important for the theory of fair salaries, justice theory and the predictive value of game theory.

Identifiers

PMID28717242
PMCPMC5514050

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.