ArticleTheoretical medicine and bioethics2017
Harm and the concept of medical disorder.
Article in Theoretical medicine and bioethics, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed, 9 citations in OpenAlex.
- Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder and the problem of defining harm to nonsentient organisms.Theoretical medicine and bioethics · 2021Article
- The harmful-dysfunction account of disorder, individual versus social values, and the interpersonal variability of harm challenge.Medicine, health care, and philosophy · 2021Article
- A naturalist response to Kingma's critique of naturalist accounts of disease.Theoretical medicine and bioethics · 2020Article
- Medical disorder, harm, and damage.Theoretical medicine and bioethics · 2020Article
- The harm of medical disorder as harm in the damage sense.Theoretical medicine and bioethics · 2019Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
1 author at 1 institution in 1 country.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
According to Jerome Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) of medical disorder, the inability of some internal part or mechanism to perform its natural function is necessary, but not sufficient, for disorder. HDA also requires that the part dysfunction be harmful to the individual. I consider several problems for HDA's harm criterion in this article. Other accounts on which harm is necessary for disorder will suffer from all or almost all of these problems. Comparative accounts of harm imply that one is harmed when one is made worse off, that is, worse off than one otherwise would have been. Non-comparative accounts imply that one is harmed when one is put into some kind of condition or state that is, in some way, bad in itself. I argue that whether harm is construed comparatively or non-comparatively, HDA's harm criterion is problematic. I tentatively conclude that an analysis of medical disorder should not make use of the concept of harm.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.