Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28659254›Full record

ArticleJournal of medical Internet research2017

Tracing the Potential Flow of Consumer Data: A Network Analysis of Prominent Health and Fitness Apps.

Quinn Grundy, Fabian P Held, Lisa A Bero

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of medical Internet research, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 18 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
18citing papers in PubMed
11.8field-weighted citation impact, top 2% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

18 citing papers in PubMed, 49 citations in OpenAlex.

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  13. Artificial Intelligence and the Implementation Challenge.Journal of medical Internet research · 2019
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Quinn GrundyCharles Perkins Centre, Faculty of Pharmacy, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia.ORCID 0000-0002-7640-8614
Fabian P HeldCharles Perkins Centre, Faculty of Science, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia.ORCID 0000-0002-5260-5576
Lisa A BeroCharles Perkins Centre, Faculty of Pharmacy, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia.ORCID 0000-0003-1893-6651
The University of Sydney · AU

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundA great deal of consumer data, collected actively through consumer reporting or passively through sensors, is shared among apps. Developers increasingly allow their programs to communicate with other apps, sensors, and Web-based services, which are promoted as features to potential users. However, health apps also routinely pose risks related to information leaks, information manipulation, and loss of information. There has been less investigation into the kinds of user data that developers are likely to collect, and who might have access to it.

objectiveWe sought to describe how consumer data generated from mobile health apps might be distributed and reused. We also aimed to outline risks to individual privacy and security presented by this potential for aggregating and combining user data across apps.

methodsWe purposively sampled prominent health and fitness apps available in the United States, Canada, and Australia Google Play and iTunes app stores in November 2015. Two independent coders extracted data from app promotional materials on app and developer characteristics, and the developer-reported collection and sharing of user data. We conducted a descriptive analysis of app, developer, and user data collection characteristics. Using structural equivalence analysis, we conducted a network analysis of sampled apps' self-reported sharing of user-generated data.

resultsWe included 297 unique apps published by 231 individual developers, which requested 58 different permissions (mean 7.95, SD 6.57). We grouped apps into 222 app families on the basis of shared ownership. Analysis of self-reported data sharing revealed a network of 359 app family nodes, with one connected central component of 210 app families (58.5%). Most (143/222, 64.4%) of the sampled app families did not report sharing any data and were therefore isolated from each other and from the core network. Fifteen app families assumed more central network positions as gatekeepers on the shortest paths that data would have to travel between other app families.

conclusionsThis cross-sectional analysis highlights the possibilities for user data collection and potential paths that data is able to travel among a sample of prominent health and fitness apps. While individual apps may not collect personally identifiable information, app families and the partners with which they share data may be able to aggregate consumer data, thus achieving a much more comprehensive picture of the individual consumer. The organizations behind the centrally connected app families represent diverse industries, including apparel manufacturers and social media platforms that are not traditionally involved in health or fitness. This analysis highlights the potential for anticipated and voluntary but also possibly unanticipated and involuntary sharing of user data, validating privacy and security concerns in mobile health.

Indexed as

Cross-Sectional StudiesData CollectionHumansMobile ApplicationsTelemedicinemobile healthprivacysmartphone

Identifiers

PMID28659254
PMCPMC5508111
OpenAlexW2729330554

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.