ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2017
Security-Enhanced Push Button Configuration for Home Smart Control.
Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
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Abstract
With the emergence of smart and converged home services, the need for the secure and easy interplay of various devices has been increased. Push Button Configuration (PBC) is one of the technologies proposed for easy set-up of a secure session between IT and consumer devices. Although the Wi-Fi Direct specification explicitly states that all devices must support the PBC method, its applicability is very limited. This is because the security vulnerability of PBC can be maliciously exploited so that attackers can make illegitimate sessions with consumer devices. To address this problem, this paper proposes a novel Security-enhanced PBC (SePBC) scheme with which we can uncover suspicious or malicious devices. The proposed mechanism has several unique features. First, we develop a secure handshake distance measurement protocol by preventing an adversary sitting outside the region from maliciously manipulating its distance to be fake. Second, it is compatible with the original Wi-Fi PBC without introducing a brand-new methodology. Finally, SePBC uses lightweight operations without CPU-intensive cryptography computation and employs inexpensive H/W. Moreover, it needs to incur little overhead when there is no attack. This paper also designs and implements the proposed SePBC in the real world. Our experimental results and analysis show that the proposed SePBC scheme effectively defeats attacks on PBC while minimizing the modification of the original PBC equipment.
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