Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28490625›Full record

ArticleProceedings. Biological sciences2017

Nonlinear trade-offs allow the cooperation game to evolve from Prisoner's Dilemma to Snowdrift.

Lin Chao, Santiago F Elena

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings. Biological sciences, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 16 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
16citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

16 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Review
  4. Article
  5. Review
  6. The evolution of cheating in viruses.Nature communications · 2021
    Review
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Review
  15. Article
  16. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Lin ChaoSection of Ecology, Behavior and Evolution, Division of Biological Sciences, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0116, USA lchao@ucsd.edu.
Santiago F ElenaInstituto de Biología Molecular y Celular de Plantas (IBMCP), Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas-Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, Ingeniero Fausto Elio s/n, 46022 Valencia, Spain.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8249-5593

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The existence of cooperation, or the production of public goods, is an evolutionary problem. Cooperation is not favoured because the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game drives cooperators to extinction. We have re-analysed this problem by using RNA viruses to motivate a model for the evolution of cooperation. Gene products are the public goods and group size is the number of virions co-infecting the same host cell. Our results show that if the trade-off between replication and production of gene products is linear, PD is observed. However, if the trade-off is nonlinear, the viruses evolve into separate lineages of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators as group size is increased. The nonlinearity was justified by the existence of real viral ultra-defectors, known as defective interfering particles, which gain a nonlinear advantage by being smaller. The evolution of ultra-defectors and ultra-cooperators creates the Snowdrift game, which promotes high-level production of public goods.

Indexed as

Biological EvolutionCooperative BehaviorGame TheoryPrisoner DilemmaVirus ReplicationRNA Virusescooperationdefective interfering particlesgame theoryPrisoner's DilemmaRNA virusesSnowdrift

Identifiers

PMID28490625
PMCPMC5443946

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.