Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28420786›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2017

Memory-

Christian Hilbe, Luis A Martinez-Vaquero, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Martin A Nowak

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 40 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
40citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

40 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Payoff equivalence and complete strategy spaces of direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  6. Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Conditional cooperation with longer memory.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Evolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024
    Article
  13. Resolving selfish and spiteful interdependent conflict.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024
    Review
  14. A geometric process of evolutionary game dynamics.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2023
    Article
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023
    Article
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Christian HilbeInstitute of Science and Technology Austria, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria; christian.hilbe@ist.ac.at.ORCID 0000-0001-5116-955X
Luis A Martinez-VaqueroInstitute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of Italy, 00185 Rome, Italy.
Krishnendu ChatterjeeInstitute of Science and Technology Austria, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria.
Martin A NowakProgram for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Humans routinely use conditionally cooperative strategies when interacting in repeated social dilemmas. They are more likely to cooperate if others cooperated before, and are ready to retaliate if others defected. To capture the emergence of reciprocity, most previous models consider subjects who can only choose from a restricted set of representative strategies, or who react to the outcome of the very last round only. As players memorize more rounds, the dimension of the strategy space increases exponentially. This increasing computational complexity renders simulations for individuals with higher cognitive abilities infeasible, especially if multiplayer interactions are taken into account. Here, we take an axiomatic approach instead. We propose several properties that a robust cooperative strategy for a repeated multiplayer dilemma should have. These properties naturally lead to a unique class of cooperative strategies, which contains the classical Win-Stay Lose-Shift rule as a special case. A comprehensive numerical analysis for the prisoner's dilemma and for the public goods game suggests that strategies of this class readily evolve across various memory-

Indexed as

Models, NeurologicalHumansMemoryevolutionary game theoryreciprocityrepeated games

Identifiers

PMID28420786
PMCPMC5422766

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.