Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28332130›Full record

ArticleHealth care analysis : HCA : journal of health philosophy and policy2018

If You're a Rawlsian, How Come You're So Close to Utilitarianism and Intuitionism? A Critique of Daniels's Accountability for Reasonableness.

Gabriele Badano

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health care analysis : HCA : journal of health philosophy and policy, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 6 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
6citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

6 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Wirtschaftsdienst (Hamburg, Germany : 1949) · 2021
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Gabriele BadanoCentre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, and Girton College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK. gb521@cam.ac.uk.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Norman Daniels's theory of 'accountability for reasonableness' is an influential conception of fairness in healthcare resource allocation. Although it is widely thought that this theory provides a consistent extension of John Rawls's general conception of justice, this paper shows that accountability for reasonableness has important points of contact with both utilitarianism and intuitionism, the main targets of Rawls's argument. My aim is to demonstrate that its overlap with utilitarianism and intuitionism leaves accountability for reasonableness open to damaging critiques. The important role that utilitarian-like cost-effectiveness calculations are allowed to play in resource allocation processes disregards the separateness of persons and is seriously unfair towards individuals whose interests are sacrificed for the sake of groups. Furthermore, the function played by intuitions in settling frequent value conflicts opens the door for sheer custom and vested interests to steer decision-making.

Indexed as

Ethical TheoryResource AllocationSocial ResponsibilityCost-Benefit AnalysisDecision MakingHealth PrioritiesHumansSocial JusticeAccountability for reasonablenessHealthcare resource allocationJohn RawlsNorman DanielsPublic justification

Identifiers

PMID28332130
PMCPMC5816125

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.