Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28274267›Full record

ArticleGlobalization and health2017

Controlling corporate influence in health policy making? An assessment of the implementation of article 5.3 of the World Health Organization framework convention on tobacco control.

Gary Jonas Fooks, Julia Smith, Kelley Lee, Chris Holden

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Globalization and health, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 37 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
37citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

37 citing papers in PubMed.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Gary Jonas FooksSchool of Languages and Social Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham, UK. g.fooks@aston.ac.uk.
Julia SmithFaculty of Health Sciences, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.
Kelley LeeFaculty of Health Sciences, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.
Chris HoldenDepartment of Social Policy and Social Work, University of York, York, UK.

Funding

Tobacco Companies, Public Policy and Global HealthR01CA091021 · NCI · U OF L LONDON SCH/HYGIENE &TROPICAL MED · PI LEE, KELLEY · 2001 to 2018
$5.1M
NCI NIH HHS R01 CA091021
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundThe World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) stands to significantly reduce tobacco-related mortality by accelerating the introduction of evidence-based tobacco control measures. However, the extent to which States Parties have implemented the Convention varies considerably. Article 5.3 of the FCTC, is intended to insulate policy-making from the tobacco industry's political influence, and aims to address barriers to strong implementation of the Convention associated with tobacco industry political activity. This paper quantitatively assesses implementation of Article 5.3's Guidelines for Implementation, evaluates the strength of Parties' efforts to implement specific recommendations, and explores how different approaches to implementation expose the policy process to continuing industry influence.

methodsWe cross-referenced a broad range of documentary data (including FCTC Party reports and World Bank data on the governance of conflicts of interest in public administration) against Article 5.3 implementation guidelines (n = 24) for 155 Parties, and performed an in-depth thematic analysis to examine the strength of implementation for specific recommendations.

resultsAcross all Parties, 16% of guideline recommendations reviewed have been implemented. Eighty-three percent of Parties that have taken some action under Article 5.3 have introduced less than a third of the guidelines. Most compliance with the guidelines is achieved through pre-existing policy instruments introduced independently of the FCTC, which rarely cover all relevant policy actors and fall short of the guideline recommendations. Measures introduced in response to the FCTC are typically restricted to health ministries and not explicit about third parties acting on behalf of the industry. Parties systematically overlook recommendations that facilitate industry monitoring.

conclusionHighly selective and incomplete implementation of specific guideline recommendations facilitates extensive ongoing opportunities for industry policy influence. Stronger commitment to implementation is required to ensure consistently strong compliance with the FCTC internationally.

Indexed as

Health PolicyHumansSmokingSmoking PreventionTobacco IndustryTobacco ProductsWorld Health OrganizationArticle 5.3Corporate political influenceGlobal health governanceTobacco industryTreaty implementationWorld Health Organization Framework Convention of Tobacco Control

Identifiers

PMID28274267
PMCPMC5343400

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.