Trial reportPsychonomic bulletin & review2017
Another chance for good reasoning.
Trial report in Psychonomic bulletin & review, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
4 citing papers in PubMed.
- What facilitates Bayesian reasoning? A crucial test of ecological rationality versus nested sets hypotheses.Psychonomic bulletin & review · 2021Article
- Processing Probability Information in Nonnumerical Settings - Teachers' Bayesian and Non-bayesian Strategies During Diagnostic Judgment.Frontiers in psychology · 2020Article
- From reading numbers to seeing ratios: a benefit of icons for risk comprehension.Psychological research · 2019Article
- (Yet) Another chance for good reasoning? A commentary and reply on Pighin, Tentori, and Girotto (2017).Psychonomic bulletin & review · 2018Article
Corrections and comments
- Commented on by
Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
Abstract
Disagreement on the "probability status" of chances casts doubt on Girotto and Gonzalez's (2001) conclusion that the human mind can make sound Bayesian inferences involving single-event probabilities. The main objection raised has been that chances are de facto natural frequencies disguised as probabilities. In the present study, we empirically demonstrated that numbers of chances are perceived as being distinct from natural frequencies and that they have a facilitatory effect on Bayesian inference tasks that is completely independent from their (minor) frequentist readings. Overall, therefore, our results strongly disconfirm the hypothesis that natural frequencies are a privileged cognitive representational format for Bayesian inferences and suggest that a significant portion of laypeople adequately handle genuine single-event probability problems once these are rendered computationally more accessible by using numbers of chances.
Indexed as
Identifiers
28265865What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.