Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28210521›Full record

ReviewInnovations in clinical neuroscience

The Right to Die in Chronic Disorders of Consciousness: Can We Avoid the Slippery Slope Argument?

Rocco Salvatore Calabrò, Antonino Naro, Rosaria De Luca, Margherita Russo, Lory Caccamo, Alfredo Manuli, Alessia Bramanti, Placido Bramanti

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Innovations in clinical neuroscience. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Physicians' End of Life Discussions with Patients: Is There an Ethical Obligation to Discuss Aid in Dying?HEC forum : an interdisciplinary journal on hospitals' ethical and legal issues · 2020
    Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

8 authors.

Rocco Salvatore CalabròDrs. Calabró, Naro, de Luca, Russo, Manuli, A. Bramanti, and P. Bramanti are from the IRCCS Centro Neurolesi "Bonino-Pulejo" in Messina, Italy; and Dr. Caccamo is from the Department of Psychology, University of Padua, Padua, Italy.
Antonino NaroDrs. Calabró, Naro, de Luca, Russo, Manuli, A. Bramanti, and P. Bramanti are from the IRCCS Centro Neurolesi "Bonino-Pulejo" in Messina, Italy; and Dr. Caccamo is from the Department of Psychology, University of Padua, Padua, Italy.
Rosaria De LucaDrs. Calabró, Naro, de Luca, Russo, Manuli, A. Bramanti, and P. Bramanti are from the IRCCS Centro Neurolesi "Bonino-Pulejo" in Messina, Italy; and Dr. Caccamo is from the Department of Psychology, University of Padua, Padua, Italy.
Margherita RussoDrs. Calabró, Naro, de Luca, Russo, Manuli, A. Bramanti, and P. Bramanti are from the IRCCS Centro Neurolesi "Bonino-Pulejo" in Messina, Italy; and Dr. Caccamo is from the Department of Psychology, University of Padua, Padua, Italy.
Lory CaccamoDrs. Calabró, Naro, de Luca, Russo, Manuli, A. Bramanti, and P. Bramanti are from the IRCCS Centro Neurolesi "Bonino-Pulejo" in Messina, Italy; and Dr. Caccamo is from the Department of Psychology, University of Padua, Padua, Italy.
Alfredo ManuliDrs. Calabró, Naro, de Luca, Russo, Manuli, A. Bramanti, and P. Bramanti are from the IRCCS Centro Neurolesi "Bonino-Pulejo" in Messina, Italy; and Dr. Caccamo is from the Department of Psychology, University of Padua, Padua, Italy.
Alessia BramantiDrs. Calabró, Naro, de Luca, Russo, Manuli, A. Bramanti, and P. Bramanti are from the IRCCS Centro Neurolesi "Bonino-Pulejo" in Messina, Italy; and Dr. Caccamo is from the Department of Psychology, University of Padua, Padua, Italy.
Placido BramantiDrs. Calabró, Naro, de Luca, Russo, Manuli, A. Bramanti, and P. Bramanti are from the IRCCS Centro Neurolesi "Bonino-Pulejo" in Messina, Italy; and Dr. Caccamo is from the Department of Psychology, University of Padua, Padua, Italy.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Managing individuals with chronic disorders of consciousness raises ethical questions about the appropriateness of maintaining life-sustaining treatments and end-of-life decisions for those who are unable to make decisions for themselves. For many years, the positions fostering the "sanctity" of human life (i.e., life is inviolable in any case) have led to maintaining life-sustaining treatments (including artificial nutrition and hydration) in patients with disorders of consciousness, allowing them to live for as long as possible. Seldom have positions that foster "dignity" of human life (i.e., everyone has the right to a worthy death) allowed for the interruption of life-sustaining treatments in some patients with disorders of consciousness. Indeed, most ethical analyses conclude that the decision to interrupt life-sustaining therapies, including artificial nutrition and hydration, should be guided by reliable information about how the patient wants or wanted to be treated and/or whether the patient wants or wanted to live in such a condition. This would be in keeping with the principles of patient-centered medicine, and would conciliate the duty of respecting both the dignity and sanctity of life and the right to a worthy death. This "right to die" has been recognized in some countries, which have legalized euthanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide, but some groups fear that legalizing end-of-life decisions for some patients may result in the inappropriate use of euthanasia, both voluntary and nonvoluntary forms (slippery slope argument) in other patients. This review describes the current opinions and ethical issues concerning end-of-life decisions in patients with disorders of consciousness, with a focus on the impact misdiagnoses of disorders of consciousness may have on end-of-life decisions, the concept of "dignity" and "sanctity" of human life in view of end-of-life decisions, and the risk of the slippery slope argument when dealing with euthanasia and end-of-life decisions. We argue that the patient's diagnosis, prognosis, and wishes should be central to determining the most appropriate therapeutic approach and end-of-life decisions for that individual. Each patient's diagnosis, prognosis, and wishes should also be central to legislation that guarantees the right to die and prevents the slippery slope argument through the establishment of evidence-based criteria and protocol for managing these patients with disorders of consciousness.

Indexed as

Artificial nutrition and hydrationeuthanasiaminimally conscious stateright to diesanctity of lifevegetative state

Identifiers

PMID28210521
PMCPMC5300707

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.