ArticleCognitive research: principles and implications2016
Bayesian reasoning in residents' preliminary diagnoses.
Article in Cognitive research: principles and implications, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.
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Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed.
- The neurocognitive gains of diagnostic reasoning training using simulated interactive veterinary cases.Scientific reports · 2019Trial
- Better understanding the clinical reasoning skills of 4th-year medical students through think aloud interviews: implications for theory and practice.Advances in health sciences education : theory and practice · 2026Article
- Musculoskeletal surgeons use mixed reasoning rather than pure Bayesian strategies in clinical practice.PloS one · 2026Article
- Misdiagnosis, Missed Diagnosis, and Delayed Diagnosis of Lupus: A Qualitative Study of Rheumatologists.Arthritis care & research · 2024Article
- Cognitive perspectives on maintaining physicians' medical expertise: II. Acquiring, maintaining, and updating cognitive skills.Cognitive research: principles and implications · 2023Review
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
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Abstract
Whether and when humans in general, and physicians in particular, use their beliefs about base rates in Bayesian reasoning tasks is a long-standing question. Unfortunately, previous research on whether doctors use their beliefs about the prevalence of diseases in diagnostic judgments has critical limitations. In this study, we assessed whether residents' beliefs about the prevalence of a disease are associated with their judgments of the likelihood of the disease in diagnosis, and whether residents' beliefs about the prevalence of diseases change across the 3 years of residency. Residents were presented with five ambiguous vignettes typical of patients presenting on the inpatient general medicine services. For each vignette, the residents judged the likelihood of five or six possible diagnoses. Afterward, they judged the prevalence within the general medicine services of all the diseases in the vignettes. Most importantly, residents who believed a disease to be more prevalent tended to rate the disease as more likely in the vignette cases, suggesting a rational tendency to incorporate their beliefs about disease prevalence into their diagnostic likelihood judgments. In addition, the residents' prevalence judgments for each disease were assessed over the 3 years of residency. The precision of the prevalence estimates increased across the 3 years of residency, though the accuracy of the prevalence estimates did not. These results imply that residents do have a rational tendency to use prevalence beliefs for diagnosis, and this finding also contributes to a larger question of whether humans intuitively use base rates for making judgments.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.