Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28148770›Full record

ArticleJournal of the Royal Society, Interface2017

Cooperators trade off ecological resilience and evolutionary stability in public goods games.

Joseph Rauch, Jane Kondev, Alvaro Sanchez

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of the Royal Society, Interface, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 14 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
14citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

14 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Directed Evolution of Microbial Communities.Annual review of biophysics · 2021
    Review
  6. Artificially selecting bacterial communities using propagule strategies.Evolution; international journal of organic evolution · 2020
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Origin of biomolecular games: deception and molecular evolution.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2018
    Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Joseph RauchDepartment of Physics and Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Brandeis University, 405 South Street, Waltham, MA 02542, USA jwrauch@brandeis.edu.ORCID 0000-0001-9965-8045
Jane KondevDepartment of Physics and Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Brandeis University, 405 South Street, Waltham, MA 02542, USA.
Alvaro SanchezThe Rowland Institute, Harvard University, 100 Edwin Land Blvd, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA alvaro.sanchez@yale.edu.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Microbial populations often rely on the cooperative production of extracellular 'public goods' molecules. The cooperative nature of public good production may lead to minimum viable population sizes, below which populations collapse. In addition, 'cooperator' public goods producing individuals face evolutionary competition from non-producing mutants, or 'freeloaders'. Thus, public goods cooperators should be resilient not only to the invasion of freeloaders, but also to ecological perturbations that may push their populations below a sustainable threshold. Through a mathematical analysis of the Ecological Public Goods Game, we show that game parameters that improve the cooperating population's stability to freeloader invasion also lead to a low ecological resilience. Complex regulatory strategies mimicking those used by microbes in nature may allow cooperators to beat this trade-off and become evolutionarily stable to invading freeloaders while at the same time maximizing their ecological resilience. Our results thus identify the coupling between resilience to evolutionary and ecological challenges as a key factor for the long-term viability of public goods cooperators.

Indexed as

Biological EvolutionGame TheoryModels, Biologicalcooperationecological resilienceevolutionary game theoryevolutionary stabilitypublic goods

Identifiers

PMID28148770
PMCPMC5332582

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.