Evidence map›Paper›PMID 28082739›Full record

ArticleNature communications2017

Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.

Andrew Mao, Lili Dworkin, Siddharth Suri, Duncan J Watts

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Nature communications, 2017. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
10citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

10 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Incentivizing free riders improves collective intelligence in social dilemmas.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023
    Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Norms and the Flexibility of Moral Action.Personality neuroscience · 2018
    Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Andrew MaoMicrosoft Research, 641 Avenue of the Americas, 7th Floor, New York, New York 10011, USA.
Lili DworkinSocratic.org, 1133 Broadway, Suite 423, New York, New York 10010, USA.
Siddharth SuriMicrosoft Research, 641 Avenue of the Americas, 7th Floor, New York, New York 10011, USA.
Duncan J WattsMicrosoft Research, 641 Avenue of the Americas, 7th Floor, New York, New York 10011, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Learning in finitely repeated games of cooperation remains poorly understood in part because their dynamics play out over a timescale exceeding that of traditional lab experiments. Here, we report results of a virtual lab experiment in which 94 subjects play up to 400 ten-round games of Prisoner's Dilemma over the course of twenty consecutive weekdays. Consistent with previous work, the typical round of first defection moves earlier for several days; however, this unravelling process stabilizes after roughly one week. Analysing individual strategies, we find that approximately 40% of players behave as resilient cooperators who avoid unravelling even at significant cost to themselves. Finally, using a standard learning model we predict that a sufficiently large minority of resilient cooperators can permanently stabilize unravelling among a majority of rational players. These results shed hopeful light on the long-term dynamics of cooperation, and demonstrate the importance of long-run experiments.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorPrisoner DilemmaAdolescentAdultDecision MakingFemaleGame TheoryHumansLearningMaleMiddle AgedResilience, PsychologicalYoung Adult

Identifiers

PMID28082739
PMCPMC5241863

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.