Evidence map›Paper›PMID 27936242›Full record

ArticlePloS one2016

Performance in Object-Choice Aesop's Fable Tasks Are Influenced by Object Biases in New Caledonian Crows but not in Human Children.

Rachael Miller, Sarah A Jelbert, Alex H Taylor, Lucy G Cheke, Russell D Gray, Elsa Loissel, Nicola S Clayton

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 6 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
6citing papers in PubMed
5.1field-weighted citation impact, top 5% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

6 citing papers in PubMed, 17 citations in OpenAlex.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

7 authors at 3 institutions in 3 countries.

Rachael MillerDepartment of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2996-9571
Sarah A JelbertDepartment of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7503-0648
Alex H TaylorSchool of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.
Lucy G ChekeDepartment of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
Russell D GraySchool of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.
Elsa LoisselDepartment of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
Nicola S ClaytonDepartment of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
University of Cambridge · GBMax Planck Society · DEUniversity of Auckland · NZ

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The ability to reason about causality underlies key aspects of human cognition, but the extent to which non-humans understand causality is still largely unknown. The Aesop's Fable paradigm, where objects are inserted into water-filled tubes to obtain out-of-reach rewards, has been used to test casual reasoning in birds and children. However, success on these tasks may be influenced by other factors, specifically, object preferences present prior to testing or arising during pre-test stone-dropping training. Here, we assessed this 'object-bias' hypothesis by giving New Caledonian crows and 5-10 year old children two object-choice Aesop's Fable experiments: sinking vs. floating objects, and solid vs. hollow objects. Before each test, we assessed subjects' object preferences and/or trained them to prefer the alternative object. Both crows and children showed pre-test object preferences, suggesting that birds in previous Aesop's Fable studies may also have had initial preferences for objects that proved to be functional on test. After training to prefer the non-functional object, crows, but not children, performed more poorly on these two object-choice Aesop's Fable tasks than subjects in previous studies. Crows dropped the non-functional objects into the tube on their first trials, indicating that, unlike many children, they do not appear to have an a priori understanding of water displacement. Alternatively, issues with inhibition could explain their performance. The crows did, however, learn to solve the tasks over time. We tested crows further to determine whether their eventual success was based on learning about the functional properties of the objects, or associating dropping the functional object with reward. Crows inserted significantly more rewarded, non-functional objects than non-rewarded, functional objects. These findings suggest that the ability of New Caledonian crows to produce performances rivaling those of young children on object-choice Aesop's Fable tasks is partly due to pre-existing object preferences.

Indexed as

Choice BehaviorAnimalsChildChild, PreschoolCrowsHumans

Identifiers

PMID27936242
PMCPMC5148090
OpenAlexW2558268560

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.