Evidence map›Paper›PMID 27829046›Full record

ArticlePloS one2016

Women Tend to Defect in a Social Dilemma Game in Southwest China.

Riccardo Pansini, Lei Shi, Rui-Wu Wang

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
1.0field-weighted citation impact, top 13% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed, 3 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors at 3 institutions in 1 country.

Riccardo PansiniState Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Kunming, 650223, China.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5046-0601
Lei ShiStatistics and Mathematics College, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, 650221, China.
Rui-Wu WangCenter for Ecological and Environmental Sciences, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, 710072, China.
Kunming Institute of Zoology · CNNorthwestern Polytechnical University · CNYunnan University of Finance And Economics · CN

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Cooperation theories assume that interacting individuals can change their strategies under different expected payoffs, depending on their social status or social situations. When looking at sex differences in cooperation, the existing studies have found that the genders cooperate at similar frequencies. However, the majority of the data originate within Western human societies. In this paper, we explore whether there are gender differences in cooperation in China. An Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game with a punishment option was used to gather data about Southwest Chinese subjects in a culture in which men have a hierarchical advantage over women. Results indicate that men invested into partners significantly more than women did (34% ♂ vs. 24% ♀) while women, in turn, were more likely to defect (65% ♀ vs. 50% ♂). In this region, women have customarily held less economic power and they are used to obtain a payoff typically lower than men. We suggest that the women's willingness to invest in cooperation has decreased throughout evolutionary time, providing us with an illustration of a culturally-driven shift towards a disparity in gender cooperation interests.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorGame TheoryPrisoner DilemmaSocial BehaviorAdolescentChinaFemaleHumansInterpersonal RelationsLinear ModelsMalePunishmentSex FactorsYoung Adult

Identifiers

PMID27829046
PMCPMC5102488
OpenAlexW2555970673

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.