ArticleScientific reports2016
Think global, act local: Preserving the global commons.
Article in Scientific reports, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 20 papers.
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Who cites it
20 citing papers in PubMed.
- Evolution of cooperation in multichannel games on multiplex networks.PLoS computational biology · 2024Article
- Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
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- Predictors and motives for mask-wearing behavior and vaccination intention.Scientific reports · 2023Article
- EGTtools: Evolutionary game dynamics in Python.iScience · 2023Article
- The evolution of universal cooperation.Science advances · 2023Article
- Reputation effects drive the joint evolution of cooperation and social rewarding.Nature communications · 2022Article
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- Assessment of long-term functional maintenance of primary human hepatocytes to predict drug-induced hepatoxicity in vitro.Archives of toxicology · 2021Article
- Evolving cooperation in multichannel games.Nature communications · 2020Article
- The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society.Scientific reports · 2020Article
- Large scale and information effects on cooperation in public good games.Scientific reports · 2019Article
- Social dilemmas among unequals.Nature · 2019Article
- Endogenous rewards promote cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2018Article
- Conducting interactive experiments online.Experimental economics · 2018Article
- Detecting reciprocity at a global scale.Science advances · 2018Article
- Is intuition really cooperative? Improved tests support the social heuristics hypothesis.PloS one · 2018Article
- Sustainability is possible despite greed - Exploring the nexus between profitability and sustainability in common pool resource systems.Scientific reports · 2017Article
- Failure to CAPTCHA Attention: Null Results from an Honesty Priming Experiment in Guatemala.Behavioral sciences (Basel, Switzerland) · 2017Article
- Guilty repair sustains cooperation, angry retaliation destroys it.Scientific reports · 2017Article
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Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
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Abstract
Preserving global public goods, such as the planet's ecosystem, depends on large-scale cooperation, which is difficult to achieve because the standard reciprocity mechanisms weaken in large groups. Here we demonstrate a method by which reciprocity can maintain cooperation in a large-scale public goods game (PGG). In a first experiment, participants in groups of on average 39 people play one round of a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) with their two nearest neighbours on a cyclic network after each PGG round. We observe that people engage in "local-to-global" reciprocity, leveraging local interactions to enforce global cooperation: Participants reduce PD cooperation with neighbours who contribute little in the PGG. In response, low PGG contributors increase their contributions if both neighbours defect in the PD. In a control condition, participants do not know their neighbours' PGG contribution and thus cannot link play in the PD to the PGG. In the control we observe a sharp decline of cooperation in the PGG, while in the treatment condition global cooperation is maintained. In a second experiment, we demonstrate the scalability of this effect: in a 1,000-person PGG, participants in the treatment condition successfully sustain public contributions. Our findings suggest that this simple "local-to-global" intervention facilitates large-scale cooperation.
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