ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2016
Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity.
Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2016. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.
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Who cites it
9 citing papers in PubMed.
- A game-theoretic attack-defense framework for the study of network resilience.Nature communications · 2026Article
- Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
- The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games.Nature communications · 2023Article
- Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023Article
- Group reciprocity and the evolution of stereotyping.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2023Article
- Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2018Article
- Article
- Evolutionary dynamics of group formation.PloS one · 2017Article
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3 authors.
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Abstract
Iterated games provide a framework to describe social interactions among groups of individuals. This body of work has focused primarily on individuals who face a simple binary choice, such as "cooperate" or "defect." Real individuals, however, can exhibit behavioral diversity, varying their input to a social interaction both qualitatively and quantitatively. Here we explore how access to a greater diversity of behavioral choices impacts the evolution of social dynamics in populations. We show that, in public goods games, some simple strategies that choose between only two possible actions can resist invasion by all multichoice invaders, even while engaging in relatively little punishment. More generally, access to a larger repertoire of behavioral choices results in a more "rugged" fitness landscape, with populations able to stabilize cooperation at multiple levels of investment. As a result, increased behavioral choice facilitates cooperation when returns on investments are low, but it hinders cooperation when returns on investments are high. Finally, we analyze iterated rock-paper-scissors games, the nontransitive payoff structure of which means that unilateral control is difficult to achieve. Despite this, we find that a large proportion of multichoice strategies can invade and resist invasion by single-choice strategies-so that even well-mixed populations will tend to evolve and maintain behavioral diversity.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.